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The purpose of this thesis is twofold: first, to provide
some background information on the development of the Antarctic
Treaty system,* its history, and its effects; and second, to
analyze the United States 7 position in relation to the
Antarctic Treaty with an eye toward ascertaining whether or not
the Antarctic Treaty is the most suitable means by which to
safeguard U.S. interests in, and on, the continent. The United
States is one of twenty "Consultative Parties" to the Antarctic
Treaty, and this position gives the U.S. a valuable
decisionmaking role in the administration of Antarctica. Since
its effective date in 1961, the Antarctic Treaty has been
singularly successful in reducing international conflict and
promoting multinational cooperation in Antarctica: in so
doing, the Treaty has been a means under which the United
States has been able to effectively conduct its Antarctic
operations with virtually no impediments other than Nature
itself. However, with the increasing international awareness
of Antarctica's potential for both living and mineral resource
exploitation, increasing international competition for
resources, and with rapid advances in technology making the
*The Antarctica Treaty system will be discussed at detail
infra . For the purposes of this paper, the "system" includes
the Antarctic Treaty and the four subordinate international
agreements thereto ( see note 159, infra). The Antarctic Treaty
"regime" refers to the decision-making in Antarctica by the
Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.

continent much less forbidding than in earlier times, the
potential for international conflict over the question of
"rights" to Antarctica has appeared on the horizon and is not
about to go away. The issue of territorial claims in
Antarctica, 1 effectively "frozen" in 1961 by Article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty, is once again surfacing and with it comes the
question whether or not, in light of changing times, the Treaty
can protect the substantial historical, scientific, and fiscal
interests which the United States has in the continent. This
paper will examine several options for U.S. policy choices in
Antarctica, assess their relative merits and weaknesses, and
suggest a plan of action which, in light of all considerations,
is submitted to be the most favorable alternative to ensure
that, despite changing world conditions, the United States will
not lose its position of advantage on the Antarctic continent.
^-See . e.g. . F. Auburn, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS (1982) ;
P. Quigg, A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA 110-
41 (1983) ; Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic
Resource Problem . 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1978) ; Bernhardt,
Sovereignty in Antarctica . 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297 (1975)
;
Cruz, The Antarctic System and the Utilization of Resources . 33
U. MIAMI L. REV. 427 (1978) ; Hayton, The "American" Antarctic .
50 AM. J. INT'l L. 583 (1956) ; Joyner, Antarctica and the Law
of the Sea: Rethinking the Current Legal Dilemmas . 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 415 (1981) ; Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone
and Antarctica . 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 691 (1981) ; Oxman, The
Antarctic Regime: An introduction . 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285
(1978) ; Toma, Soviet Attitude Towards the Acquisition of
territorial Sovereign in the Antarctic . 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 611
(1956) ; Note, Quick, Before It Melts: Toward a Resolution of
the Jurisdictional Morass in Antarctica . 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
173 (1976) ; Note, Thaw in International Law/ Rights in
Antarctica Under the Law of Common Spaces . 87 YALE L.J. 804
(1978) . See also Parriott, Territorial Claims in Antarctica .
22 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 67 (1986).

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Place Called Antarctica
There is no place on earth like Antarctica. 2 The last of
this planet's continents to be discovered and explored, it is
believed that during the Mezoic Era Antarctica was originally
part of a supercontinental land mass referred to as
Gondwanaland, comprised of the areas we know now as Africa,
Australia, India, Madagascar, and South America. 3 Antarctica
is hypothesized to have separated from this land mass as a
result of continental drift and to have settled at its current
position. 4 It has been said that the Antarctic continent is
essentially a giant ice cube, 5 but such is a description which
fails to describe the true composition of the continent.
Unlike the northern Arctic region, Antarctica is a continental
land mass (and the fifth largest continent) covering more than
2As discussed in this article, Antarctica is defined as
the mass of ice and land, including ice shelves, existing south
of sixty degrees South latitude. This definition corresponds
to the definition contained in Article VI of the Antarctic
Treaty. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S.
No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force June 23, 1961).
3Schachter, S. & Schuyler, C. , The Antarctic Minerals
Policy of the United States 1 (Sept., 1984).
4 Id. at 1.
5Burton, Antarctic Resources . 65 VA. L. REV. 421 (1979)
.

five million square miles, 6 ninety-seven percent of which is
covered by permanent ice7 which averages more than one mile
thick. 8 While Antarctica does contain the Trans-Antarctic
Mountains which peak at 8,000 to 15,000 feet above sea level,
the vast majority of this range is covered by the permanent ice
and only a few hundred feet of mountain protrude above ice. 9
The mainland of Antarctica consists of two physically
distinct regions, Eastern Antarctica and Western Antarctica.
Eastern Antarctica is a large, high-altitude, ice-covered
plateau; Western Antarctica is an archipelago of mountainous
islands joined together by ice. 10 Eastern Antarctica is the
world's largest and driest desert; 11 precipitation there
averages under one inch annually. 12 Severe winds in Antarctica
6See U.S. Activities in Antarctica: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources , 96th Cong. , 1st
Sess. 4 (1979) (statement of Dr. Edward P. Todd, Director,
Division of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation)
;
Fletcher & Kelly, The Role of Polar Regions in Global Climate
Change, in POLAR RESEARCH: TO THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE 97
(M. McWhinnie ed. 1978) ; RESEARCH IN THE ANTARCTIC 367 (L. Quam
ed. 1971) [area of Antarctica 12,393,000 km2 excluding offshore
islands and protruding ice shelves); de Blij , A Regional
Geography of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean . 33 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 299, 305 (1978) ; Bertrand, Antarctica: Conflict or
Compromise? . FRONTIERS, Autumn 1978, at 9.
7Parriott, Territorial Claims in Antarctica . 22 Stanford
J. Int'l L. (1986)
.
8 Id. at 70 n. 9.
9See Burton, supra note 5, at 425.




cause constant blizzards despite the lack of snow. 13
Antarctica is also the coldest continent, with temperatures
frequently falling to -80° C (-112° F) in the interior and to
-70° C (-94° F) in coastal areas. 14
Antarctica is also surrounded by thick and relatively
permanent fields of ice called ice shelves. 15 Parts of the ice
shelves frequently break off, forming icebergs. 16 These
icebergs make navigation in the water surrounding Antarctica
hazardous, and pose a severe obstacle to future offshore
activities. 17 In addition to the ice shelves, a ring of small,
floating ice called pack ice surrounds the Antarctic
mainland. 18 During the winter the pack ice extends seaward,
nearly doubling the size of the continent. 19 Despite all this
ice, the general lack of precipitation throughout Antarctica
creates desert-like conditions regarding the water supply. 20
Virtually the only source for fresh water on the continent is
13id.
14 Id.




20U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Polar Regions Atlas 37
(1978) .

melted snow and ice. 21 With regard to the nearest land mass
neighbors, it is 600 statute miles to South America, 1,600
miles to New Zealand, 600 miles to Australia, and 2,450 miles
to South Africa. 22
The continent of Antarctica is surrounded by the Southern
Ocean, which is basically distinguished from its contiguous
(Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian) oceans by the Antarctic
Convergence where water chilled by the Antarctic climate and
melted ice meets the warmer waters of the other aforementioned
oceans. 23 The Antarctic Convergence is geographically located
approximately between 46° South latitude and 62° South
latitude. 24 Within the Southern Ocean and near the Antarctic
coast exists a food chain which contains abundant quantities of
phytoplankton, zooplankton (such as krill) , marine mammals (for
example, seals and whales) , marine birds (including penguins)
,
and other living resources. A more detailed analysis of these
and other Antarctic resources will be reserved for later
discussion.
21Burton, supra note 5, at 425.
22 Id. at 426 n. 25.
23 Id. at 426 n. 29.
24Knox, The Living Resources of the Southern Ocean: A




B. The Issue of Territorial Claims In Antarctica
1. Bases for Claims
As might be expected in assertions of sovereign interest
in the last continent discovered, most claims to either
territorial sovereignty or to a basis for any future claim to
territorial sovereignty are founded on acts of discovery. Only
Argentina and Chile, of the Antarctica claimant nations, do not
found their respective claims on discovery. 25 Claims to
territorial sovereignty assert an exclusive right to exercise
governmental authority, or to display the activities of a
state, within the claimed territory. 26 The assertion of
sovereignty over a territory is basically the assertion of an
exclusive right to prescribe and enforce laws forbidding entry
without permission into that territory, and includes imposing
extensive limitations on permitted activities within the
territory. Accordingly, claimant states deny that anyone can
enter upon their respective claimed Antarctic territories
without the claimant state's consent, and subject to such
conditions and limitations as the claimant state may impose. A
sovereign state's discretion in such matters is limited only by
generally applicable principles of international law. 27 Along
with such asserted territorial sovereignty comes its corollary:
25Auburn, supra note 1, at 6.
26Burton, supra note 5, at 460 n. 166
27 Id. at 460.

the potential to claim submarine land and waters adjacent to
the claimed coastline. 28 Thus, along with issues of
territorial claims evolved issues of coastal states' rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources
of any claimed territorial sea and/or continental shelf. 29
By the mid-194 Os, seven countries — Argentina, Australia,
Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom —
had made territorial claims to approximately 80% of the
Antarctic continent. 30 The remainder of Antarctica was, and
still is, unclaimed. With the advent of the International
Geophysical Year in 1957, five other nations (Belgium, Japan,
South Africa, the United States, and the USSR) claimed an
interest in Antarctica but none made an official territorial
claim or recognized the territorial claims made by other
nations. 3 ^
There are several theories upon which territorial claims
and the right to assert such claims in the future have been
historically premised. While in general sovereignty over
territory can be grounded on theories of occupation,
prescription, conquest, cession, and accretion, 32 it seems that
28Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica . 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
117 (1947).
29Burton, supra note 5, at 461.
30Parriott, supra note 7, at 76.
31Luard, Who Owns the Antarctic? . Foreign Affairs 1175,
1182-83 (Summer 1984).
32Parriott, supra note 7, at 76 n. 62.
8

territorial claims in Antarctica are most logically and
properly based on the theory of occupation, which is "the
appropriation by a State of territory which is not at the time
subject to the sovereignty of any State." 33 The validity of
this position rests on the assumption that Antarctica is
considered terra nullius (the territory of no one) and a strong
argument for this assumption can be made based upon the
uninhabited nature of the continent itself up until the
twentieth century. 34 Additionally, a strong practical and
political argument has been advanced for the treatment of
Antarctica as terra nullius based upon the millions of dollars
already expended by interested parties to secure toeholds on
the continent, the consequence of which would be a tremendous
unwillingness to sacrifice such investments already made. 35
While discovery, as noted above, formed the basis for most
territorial claims, it has never been considered that this
basis was particularly strong because under the discovery
theory, more than a visual sighting of new lands was required:
discovery created only inchoate title, the perfection of which
required the taking of possession coupled with acts of
authority over the territory. 36 The creation of inchoate title
33 Id. at 77 n. 67.
34Kindt, Resource Exploitation in Antarctica . 14 BROOKLYN
J. INT'L L. 1 (1988)
.
35Parriott, supra note 7, at 78 n. 73.
36Id. . at 78.

prevented other nations from appropriating this discovered
territory, 37 but only for a limited time: the nation with
inchoate title must perfect that title by "effective
occupation" 38 within a reasonable time. It is generally
believed that no specific time limits can be imposed upon this
"reasonable" time period, but that such a period is dependent
on the particular conditions and circumstances of the
territory. 39 For territorial claimants in Antarctica, its
uninhabited character and foreboding environmental conditions
most likely allow a far greater degree of flexibility in
establishing a claim to perfected title than in the rest of the
world. Despite such flexibility, however, numerous critics
have attacked the discovery theory as a basis for title in
Antarctica. 40
Several other theories have been advanced by claimant
states for the assertion of territorial claims in Antarctica.
As a general rule, each of the following theories has been
attacked either as being inapplicable to Antarctica or as being
an improper rationale upon which to claim territorial rights.
The "sector principle", originally applied to Arctic polar
37 Id. at 79.
38 Id. at 78 n. 77.
39 Id. at 79 n. 83.
40Auburn, supra note 1, at 7-9.
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regions by Canada, 41 envisioned pie-shaped sectors emanating
out from the South Pole and encompassing either the areas of
Antarctica within which the claimant states have asserted
territorial jurisdiction, or the east-west extremities of the
mainland boundaries of the claimant state. 42 Sector theory
claimants include at least Australia, France, New Zealand,
Norway and Great Britain, and arguably (at least in part)
Argentina and Chile. 43 This theory of territorial acquisition
has been severely undercut as being inapplicable to Antarctica
in that there is no mainland boundary close enough to the
continent to make a plausible argument for contiguity, 44 and on
the additional basis that the sector principle as applied to
Antarctica lacks the geographical basis (i.e., territory of the
claimant state within the defined area of claimancy) upon which
the theory is predicated. 45 Other related principles such as
propinquity, contiguity, and continuity have also been advanced
as supplemental bases for territorial claimancy, but the
validity of each has been similarly generally repudiated,
primarily due to the great geographical separations between
Antarctica and the claimants and, historically, due to the lack
41Conforti, Territorial Claims in Antarctica . 19 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 249 (1986)
.
42 Id. at 253; Parriott, supra note 7, at 87.
43Parriott, supra note 7, at 87 n. 144.
44 Id. at 88 n. 147.
45Conforti, supra note 41, at 254.
11

of economic links between the claimants and the continent. 46
One final principle worth mentioning regarding the basis for
territorial claims is that of uti posseditis (retention of
possession by right), advanced by both Chile and Argentina. 47
The principle suggests that the nations "inherited" from Spain
the borders between the South American states that existed
prior to independence and, by applying the uti posseditis
principle, Argentina and Chile maintain that they inherited
Antarctica from Spain. To support their claim, the two states
rely upon the Bull of Pope Alexander the 7th of 1483, which,
basically, gave one half of the world to Spain and the other
half to Portugal (Antarctica was situated entirely in that half
of the world given to Spain). 48 While this theory is still
used as part of the foundation for the claims of these South
American nations, this position is not presently viewed as a
proper basis for Antarctic sovereignty. 49
2. Recognition/Nonrecognition of Claims
Although there have been various theories put forward for
the assertion of territorial claims in Antarctica, the fact
46Parriott, supra note 7, at 86. In particular,
Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and South Africa
invoke continuity theory to support territorial claims. Id. at
86 n. 136; see also Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and
Antarctica, 21 VA. J. INT'L. L. 691 (1982), at 708 n. 94, 95.
47 Id. at 87.
48Conforti, supra note 41, at 255.
49Parriott, supra note 7, at 87 n. 143.
12

remains that the seven nations making such claims are in the
pronounced minority of world nations. The issue of recognition
or nonrecognition of claims, however, has traditionally been
one of serious national (and international) concern regarding
potential conflict and, as will be examined later, is one of
ever-growing importance in international affairs.
Underlying the question of the validity of territorial
claims in Antarctica is an issue which essentially divides
world opinion into two opposite camps: whether Antarctica
should be regarded as terra nullius (territory of no one), 50 or
res communis (territory common to all, and thus immune from
claims of State sovereignty or national appropriation). 51
Professor Joyner succinctly encapsulates the critical
distinction as applied to Antarctica as follows:
As terra nullius . the Antarctic
continent and its resources would be
subject to national appropriation should
the Antarctic Treaty expire in 1991. The
claims asserted by claimant States, as well
as proclaimed EEZs, would gain legal
validity, and it is likely that other
States would claim the unacquired portions
of Antarctica. It is also likely that the
overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile, and
the United Kingdom would lead to conflict,
as already happened in 1948, 1953, and
1956. Different consequences would
probably result if the current treaty
regime were extended and if the Antarctic
region were terra nullius . In that
situation, only those States that are
parties to the treaty would be bound by its
50See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
5Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica . 21
VA. J. INT'L. L. 691 (1981), at 709 n. 99.
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provisions. Because now under the treaty,
a "State" may not exist on the continent,
it is uncertain how the concepts of
"coastal States" possessing "territorial
waters" and "economic resource zones" would
be applied to non-parties making claims on
the continent.
If considered res communis . on the
other hand, Antarctica and its coastal
resources would be insulated from State
appropriation. The entire region, by
definition, would lie beyond the reach of
national sovereignty and resultant
jurisdiction. Such an approach strongly
resembles the "common heritage of mankind"
principle that the UNCLOS III negotiations
have applied to the deep seabed. 52
The difference in the two analyses, and their effects on
territorial claimants, is clear. Self interest and protection
of investment dictate that claimant nations maintain their
assertions of territorial rights in Antarctica by whatever
theory or theories best relates to their respective historical
positions. Conversely, the rest of the international community
will be similarly motivated to resist any attempts at
expropriation and (except for parties to the Antarctic
Treaty) 53 insist that the evolving customary international law
applicable, in particular, to resource exploitation beyond
national jurisdiction requires dealing with Antarctica as res
communis54 under a regime analogous to those proposed in the
52 Id. at 709, 710.
53T.I.A.S. 4780; 12 U.S.T. 794; 402 U.N.T.S. 71; 54 AJIL
477 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Antarctic Treaty].
54Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in




1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 55 the Moon Treaty of 1979 , 56
and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. 57
Additional problems exist for nations making territorial
claims in Antarctica due to the fact that even if such claims
were, arguendo . valid vis a vis other nonclaimant nations,
there are several claims in Antarctica which overlap. The
claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom overlap and
conflict in substantial part. 58 Another potential overlap that
may give rise to an even greater conflict must also be taken
into account: five of the original Consultative Parties
(Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the USA, and USSR) to the
Antarctic Treaty refuse to recognize the territorial claims of
55United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 126 (1982).
56Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1979,
art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/34/64, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434
(1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984)
.
57Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 204 art. II (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1967).
58Joyner, supra note 51, at 708. Argentina's claim in
Antarctica encompasses the area between the 25th and 74th
meridians of longitude, extending in the shape of a wedge from
the South Pole to the 60th parallel. Id. at 705 n. 83. Chile
claims "all lands, islands, inlets, reefs, pack-ice, etc.,
known and to be discovered, and their respective territorial
sea, lying within the limit of the sector constituted by the
meridians of 53° west longitude and 90° west longitude. Id. at
706 n. 85. The United Kingdom's claim originally encompassed
"all lands and territories whatsoever" in the region between
50° and 2 0° west longitude, and bounded on the north by the 50°
parallel of south latitude. Id. at 707 n. 89.
15

the seven claimant nations and, having expressly preserved
their rights to make territorial claims, 59 have installations
situated throughout the continent and within the sectors
claimed by the seven claimant nations. Perhaps the most
glaring example of this conflict (and potential for future
problems, absent the Antarctic Treaty) is the U.S. presence
within the New Zealand claimancy, where the United States
operations in McMurdo Sound are its largest60 on the continent
and, by comparison, dwarf the New Zealand presence. 61
Of the nonclaimant states, an assessment of the positions
of the United States and the Soviet Union in particular is
necessary. Such special treatment is not meant to denigrate
the positions or interests of any other nations with an
interest (present or future) in Antarctica, but is considered
for the purposes of this paper to be necessary. An analysis of
the U.S. position is required as a basis for the writer's
conclusions as to the recommended course of U.S. action in the
future. The examination of the Soviet policy and presence in
Antarctica is valuable not only to point out another approach
59Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, Article IV.
60S. Nelson, Briefing on U.S. Naw Role in U.S. Antarctic
Program 9 (Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, 1987)
.
61S. Nelson, Narrative for the Briefing in U.S. Naw Role
in U.S. Antarctic Program 8A (Office of the Oceanographer of
the Navy, Dec. 17, 1987).
16

to the "question of Antarctica" 62 but also to illustrate in
Section V, infra , what the United States must consider with
regard to another superpower in world politics in mapping out
its strategy for protection of U.S. interests in Antarctica.
The "flip side" of the principle of territorial
sovereignty is the principle of open use, a principle which has
characterized both the U.S. and Soviet positions. 63 States
adhering to this principle do not recognize claims to
territorial sovereignty. No part of Antarctica under this
approach can be subject to national sovereignty and, in the
absence of specific treaty obligations, Antarctica is governed
solely by general principles of international law. A corollary
of the principle of open use is that any nation may enter the
continent and undertake activities not prohibited by general
international law, such as activities of resource development.
The only exercise of governmental authority in Antarctica, with
a few special exceptions, comes from the jurisdiction of a
state over its own nationals or activities. 64 Under this view,
the Antarctic continent can be considered in any of three ways:
terra nullius . terra communis , or as a "special area". 65
Irrespective of which of these three concepts is applied,
620uestion of Antarctica: Report of the Secretary-
General . 39 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 66) , U.N. Doc. A/39/583
(1984) .
63Burton, supra note 5, at 462.
64 Id. at 462, n. 173-175.
65Id. at 463 n. 178.
17

however, the end result under this open use principle is
nonrecognition of territorial claims. As a general corollary
to this principle, nonrecognition of territorial rights would
preclude the assertion of coastal state rights in adjacent
offshore areas. 66
The history of U.S. policy in Antarctica has followed a
long but somewhat inconsistent path. Although it appears
overly harsh to say that U.S. policy has been to have no
meaningful policy, 67 the fact remains that the United States'
approach to Antarctica has been ill-defined, at best.
The first evidence of a U.S. presence in Antarctica was a
sealing expedition in 1790 in the South Georgia Islands. 68
Similar expeditions worked the Antarctic Peninsula area, and
one such venture was by Captain Palmer of the HERO in 182 0-21
which gave rise to a claim to the first "discovery" of the
Antarctic continent (and, concomitantly, an intensive debate
over priority of claim). 69 The first government-financed U.S.
expedition was the 1840 Wilkes' United States Exploring
Expedition, a scientific project to survey the coastline of
what is now claimed by Australia as the Australian Antarctic
66Id. at 464.
67Auburn, supra note 1, at 75 n. 208.
68Bertrand, AMERICANS IN ANTARCTICA 1775-1948 (1971), 25.
69Auburn, supra note 1, at 62 n. 119.
18

Territory. This expedition conducted its survey but did not
land, 70 and no U.S. claim was made. 71
U.S. presence in the Antarctic territory was thereafter
virtually nonexistent until the 1920s. The tone for the
official U.S. position regarding Antarctica was (perhaps
unfortunately) set in 1924 by U.S. Secretary of State Hughes
who, in correspondence with the British Ambassador to the
United States stated that "the discovery of lands unknown to
civilization, even when coupled with a formal taking of
possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty
unless the discovery is followed by actual settlement of the
discovered country." 72 From 1924 to 1959, the United States
outwardly followed this policy under the assumption that
Antarctica was not amenable to effective occupation. 73 Thus,
during that period the United States did not formally ratify
the territorial claims made by two U.S. citizens, Admiral Byrd
and Lincoln Ellsworth. Similarly, the United States did not
formally make any territorial claims in subsequent exploration
of Antarctica or while establishing scientific bases there. 74
It appears that during this time it would have been possible
for the United States to have made a territorial claim to
70Parriott, supra note 7, at 101.
71Auburn, supra note 1, at 62.
72 Id. supra note 1, at 64 n. 29.
73 Id. at 64-65.
74 Id. at 64; Parriott, supra note 7, at 101 n. 238, 239.
19

certain areas of Antarctica that, based upon the discovery
theory of territorial sovereignty, could have been at least as
valid as any of the seven claimant nations. 75 Indeed, a
variety of expeditions that were either private, "covert", or
officially sanctioned by the United States after 1924 could
have served as the bases for such a claim. 76 The U.S. even
went so far in 1939 as to authorize expeditions that were
intended to support claims to territorial sovereignty, and
purported to create evidence of some semblance of an effective
exercise of sovereignty by planting U.S. flags, depositing
claims sheets in cairns, and (as late as 1947) dropping claims
papers during Antarctic overflights which were part of U.S.
Navy training exercises (known as "Operation High Jump" and
"Operation Windmill"). 77 Despite the laying of such a
75See notes 238-257, infra and accompanying text.
76Two expeditions by Admiral Byrd were significant in
establishing an American presence in Antarctica. The first,
between 1928 and 1930, established a base at Little America on
the Ross Ice Shelf and carried out scientific work in the Queen
Maud Mountains and flights to the South Pole and Marie Byrd
Land. This expedition also claimed part of the area east of
150° W (the eastern boundary of the Ross Dependency) . From
1933 to 1935 the Admiral's second private expedition worked in
the same area expanding activities in Edward VII Land and Marie
Byrd Land. Furthermore, Lincoln Ellsworth flew across the
continent from Dundee Island in the Antarctic Peninsula to
Little America in 1935, claiming the land between 80° W and
120° W for the United States as James W. Ellsworth Land. A
further flight 240 miles inland in 1939 brought a claim to the
area south of 70° S.in the Australian Antarctic Territory,
covering 150 miles south, east and west of 70° E, which was the
line of flight. Although Ellsworth's flights were private, his
1939 claim had the covert support of the Department of State.
Auburn, supra note 1, at 62 n. 120-122.
77 Id. at 62-63.
20

foundation, the United States never officially or publicly
asserted any territorial claim to Antarctica. U.S. activities
in Antarctica preceding the International Geophysical Year
(1958) and the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 evidence the fact that
the U.S. position may best be described as inconsistent: 78
while expeditions were commissioned to bolster79 any claim the
U.S. may make, no such territorial claim was ever perfected or
asserted. The U.S. position has evolved into one of refusing
to recognize the claim of any other nation in Antarctica, while
simultaneously reserving its own "basic historic rights." 80
This rather anomalous position will contribute substantially to
the inability of the United States to assert an effective
territorial claim in Antarctica today or in the future. 81
It may seem peculiar that the Soviet Union, a superpower
traditionally and ideologically on the opposite side from the
United States on many issues, is also a nonclaimant player in
the Antarctica of today and tomorrow. Like the United States,
the Soviet Union has never asserted an official claim to any
portion of Antarctica; it also has reserved to itself the right
to assert "all rights based on discoveries and explorations of
Russian navigators and scientists, including the right to
78 Id. at 64.
79Parriott, supra note 7, at 101.
80Department of State in 'U.S. Antarctic Policy', Hearing,
Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, Committee
on Foreign Relations, Senate 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 18.
81See notes 263-68, infra ; Auburn, supra note 1, at 65.
21

present corresponding territorial claims in the Antarctic." 82
This reservation of right based on discovery is very similar,
historically, to the U.S. position. As will be examined later,
it appears that the validity, strengths, and weaknesses of the
Soviet claim, as well as its stake in Antarctica's future, also
closely coincide with U.S. positions.
Historically, the Soviet claim to priority in the
discovery of Antarctica passes to the Soviet Union by
succession from Russia. 83 It is claimed that the Russian
explorer Bellingshausen was the first man to sight the
Antarctic continent, on 27 January 1820, and that any rights of
territorial sovereignty based upon the discovery theory could
be founded on his expedition. 84 Although such sighting has
been roundly attacked because of insufficient evidence, it is
important because if any right in Antarctica could accrue due
to discovery, this first sighting could arguably give priority
rights to the Soviet Union. In light of this, it is doubtful
that the Soviet Union will retreat from this position. 85
The problem with any potential Soviet claim to, or in,
Antarctica based upon discovery is the same that plagues all
such claims: the concept of effective occupation within a
82Boczek, The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime . 78
AJIL 834 (1984), at 843.
83 Id. at 843 n. 36.
84 Id. at 843.
85Auburn, supra note 1, at 78.
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reasonable period. 86 In the Soviet case this requirement must
be particularly distressing in that after Bellingshausen, there
was no further Russian or Soviet activity in Antarctica for the
next 125 years. 87 Even under the more relaxed standards for
effective occupation which emerged from the celebrated Eastern
Greenland . Island of Palmas . and Clipperton Island cases in
1933, 1928, and 1932, respectively, 88 a gap of more than 100
years between contacts is generally not considered to be a
reasonable period. 89 Perhaps a realization that this is a
relatively slender reed upon which one might be forced to build
a discovery theory claim for Soviet Antarctic presence could be
seen in one Soviet public assertion in 1981 that, although the
Soviet Union could claim "very considerable territorial rights"
on a historical basis, "it has not done so in the interests of
peace." 90 At any rate, the Soviet Union rejects what it
considers to be an "imperialist" doctrine of effective
occupation as affecting its rights in Antarctica and views
86See notes 263-68, supra.
87Auburn, supra note 1, at 78 n. 222.
88Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 PCIJ, ser. A/B,
No. 53; Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.O, 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829 (1928) , reprinted in 22 AJIL 867 (1928) ; Clipperton
Island Case, 2 UNRIAA 1105 (1932) . These cases and the
principle of effective occupation will be more fully analyzed
in a later section of this thesis.
89Boczek, supra note 82, at 841.
90Id. at 841 n. 39.
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discovery alone, without subsequent abandonment or renunciation
of those rights, as being determinative. 91
It is at this point that a difference between the U.S. and
the Soviet approach to the "question of Antarctica" 92 can
easily be made. While still refraining from any assertion of
an Antarctic territorial claim, the Soviet Union has proceeded
to continually expand its Antarctic presence since 194 6. It
has been said that the modern Soviet campaign for involvement
in Antarctica basically began with a February 10, 1949
Resolution of the All-Soviet Geographical Society which
asserted the "indisputable and historic right of the Soviet
Union to participate in solving the Antarctica problem." 93
With the establishment of its first base at Mirny in 1956, the
Soviet Union has increased its investment in Antarctic
expeditions and base construction to the point where it is now
(behind the United States) maintaining the second largest
Antarctic presence. 94 While it may initially have been the
U.S. interpretation of Soviet involvement that the Soviet Union
was motivated only by a desire to earn the right to participate
91The Soviet Union appears to apply this rationale
selectively. Its argument regarding Antarctica is not
officially endorsed with regard to the Arctic region. See
Boczek, supra note 82, at 842.
92See note 62, supra .
93Boczek, supra note 82, at 837.
94R. Scott, "Protecting United States Interests in




in any future legal regime for Antarctica, 95 it is now
theorized that the steady expansion of Soviet activities is
more in line with enhancing the validity of making any future
territorial claim if the current Antarctic Treaty becomes
ineffective or is terminated. 96 It is interesting to note that
the Soviet Union now operates seven permanent all-year stations
in Antarctica, and the Soviet presence appears to be
strategically located in all sectors of Antarctica, including
the area which could (and has) arguably been referred to as the
"American sector". 97 The Soviet Union has traditionally
demonstrated a major interest in the development of Antarctic
resources, and by 1982 had developed one of the largest and
most obviously resource-oriented geological research programs
in Antarctica. 98 When its economic interests are combined with
its unparalleled experience in polar technology99 the Soviet
Union's program appears to be one designed to secure the best
possible bargaining basis for that nation in any future
allocation of mineral rights. 100
95Boczek, supra note 82, at 842; Auburn, supra note 1, at
82.
96Id. ; Id.
97Auburn, supra note 1, at 81.
98Mitchell, The Southern Ocean in the 80s . 3 Ocean Y.B.
379 (1982).
"Auburn, supra note 1, at 79.
100Mitchell, supra note 98; Boczek, supra note 82, at 847.
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The difference, then, between the U.S. and the Soviet
positions in Antarctica appears to be in the direction in which
each one has been going. The U.S. Antarctic program, while
still the largest, arguably has peaked in terms of its number
of scientific bases, and has in fact abandoned or relinquished
control over some of its installations since the 1950s. 101 The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, has continually expanded its
presence, both geographically and economically. 102
III. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND ITS PROGENY
The development, history, and effect of the Antarctic
Treaty are of great importance in any analysis of the
101In 1957, the United States made the decision to reduce
costs in the Antarctic program: Ellsworth Station was handed
over to Argentina and Wilkes to Australia, both considered
allies. A year later United States officials felt that it was
to America's national benefit that the Belgian station be
maintained without assistance from the nearby Soviet
expedition. In both instances friendly nations were seen as
surrogates for the United States. But the activities of the
three countries concerned, especially the two claimants, could
not support American territorial rights. Auburn, supra note 1,
at 83.
102The Soviet Union transferred the Oazis Station on the
coast of the Australian Antarctic Territory between Mirny
(Soviet Union) and Wilkes (United States) to Poland in January
1959. It is currently maintained by Poland as an austral
summer installation, but if the base becomes permanent, the
territorial position of the Soviet Union, with its main base
(Mirny) and an inland station (Vostok) in the sector, will be
unimpaired. Sixteen years later Poland set up the permanent
Arctowski Station on King George Island, a few miles from
Bellingshausen (the only Soviet base in the Antarctic
Peninsula) . The Soviet Union clearly does not regard allies as
surrogates for its Antarctic interests. Not only has it
continuously extended its sphere of interest, but it has also
directly challenged the United States by establishing a base in
the 'United States sector' and working on the Dufek Massif. Id.
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territorial claims issue in Antarctica. The Treaty itself has
been considered as a successful adaptation to the general
absence of legislature, courts, and police in the international
legal system, 103 and as an "alternative, pragmatic model of
international law", 104 coming at a time when the absence of a
solution to the "Antarctic question" posed a serious threat to
world stability. Shortly before, and during, World War II, the
strategic importance of the Antarctic territory was recognized
and the interest in either acquiring new territory or in
securing already established "stakes" became of heightened
international interest and tension. 105
The Antarctic Treaty was based on a lengthy international
dialogue which was predicated on a 1948 U.S. proposal
attempting to minimize friction and potential conflicts between
overlapping claimancies in Antarctica. 106 To curtail any
103Burton, supra note 5, at 425.
104ld^
1 °5Hambro , Some Notes On the Future of the Antarctic
Treaty Collaboration , 68 AJIL 217 (1974).
106During the Antarctic summer seasons of 1946-47 and
1947-48 Argentina and Chile sent naval expeditions into the
British-claimed area known as the Falkland Islands
Dependencies. The greater part of the latter is also claimed
by Argentina and Chile. The U.K. formally protested against
Argentine and Chilean "acts of trespass." These two
governments, in their several replies, rejected the British
assertion and also the offer of the U.K. to submit the entire
question of conflicting Antarctic claims to the International
Court of Justice. Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959 . 9
INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 436 (1960), n. 1.
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"scramble for Antarctica", 107 the United States proposed first
a trusteeship arrangement under Articles 75, 76, 77, and 79 of
the Charter of the United Nations, 108 and followed up on this
general concept (after its rejection by the international
community) with an idea to internationalize Antarctica as a
multiple condominium, separate from the United Nations but
still maintaining liaison with it. 109 Neither initiative
succeeded, but a solution was still needed. Despite the
»
diversity of nations which professed a serious interest in
Antarctica, several common interests prevailed. Arguably the
major area of common interest was the preservation of a
continental environment conducive to freedom of scientific
research. 110 Another major common interest was concerning
strategic considerations: After the International Geophysical
Year, it was clear that the Soviet Union intended to be a key
player in any Antarctic scenario. It was also clear that, with
international tensions aggravated by the Cold War, the concept
of a Soviet military presence in Antarctica posed a significant
threat to the United States and its allies. 111 With this in
mind, the demilitarization of Antarctica seemed to be an
107See Washington Post editorial, "Antarctic Claims,"
January 2, 1947 and New York Times correspondence, February 26,
1947, "Antarctic Sovereignty," Id. . n. 2.
108Hanessian, supra note 106, at 437.
109 Id. at 438.
110Id.
111Burton, supra note 5, at 475.
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efficient means to negate any Soviet military threat to the
Southern Hemisphere from an Antarctic base. 112 While Soviet
interest in demilitarization has been the source of varied
speculation, 113 it is believed that at least one factor
promoting demilitarization is that, by removing Antarctica from
the arena of strategic rivalry, all parties concerned could cut
fiscal outlays from potential Antarctic defense projects and
reallocate budget priorities accordingly. 114
A third area of common concern was dictated by the reality
of world politics at the time. Of the twelve participants in
the International Geophysical Year, ten were allied with the
United States by security treaties 115 and extensive political,
historical, and economic ties. 116 None of this group was
interested in introducing an area of conflict which might
undercut these relationships. Indeed, even the non-allied
nations (Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the Union of
South Africa) 117 had a strong interest in reducing world
friction and removing Antarctica from the field of
international discord: the resultant effect was that, for
whatever variety existed in individual national interests, the
112 Id. at n. 214, 215.
113 Id. at 476.
114 Id.
115Id. at 477 n. 217.
116Id. at 476.
117See note 115 supra .
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collective sense was that "Antarctica shall not become the
scene or object of international discord." 118
Perhaps the key fact to be gleaned from the pre-Treaty
negotiations and discussions is that the Soviet Union was never
included, despite U.S. insistence that all interested parties
be allowed to participate. 119 One factor cited for this
seemingly glaring omission was the "background stress" created
by East-West tensions in Berlin in 1948, 120 but it was not long
thereafter that the Soviet Union entered the stage. In a
U.S.S.R. Memorandum on June 9, 1950, addressed simultaneously
to the governments of Argentina, Australia, France, Norway, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Soviet
Union essentially stated that in accordance with "international
practice" any consultation concerning the future of Antarctica
must allow the Soviet Union to participate, due to its being an
"interested party in an area of international significance",
warning that the Soviet Government could not recognize as legal
any decision on an Antarctic regime in which it did not
participate. 121 While this Soviet Memorandum did not generate
118Hanessian, supra note 106; Antarctic Treaty Preamble.
119Id. at 439.
120Id. The author specifically refers to the Soviet land
blockade of Berlin and the subsequent launching of the joint
U.S. -U.K. "Berlin airlift" on June 26, 1948 as an incident
which made it impossible to consider Antarctic negotiations




much official response at the time, 122 it certainly declared
Soviet interest and depth of concern for future Antarctic
discussions.
Prefaced by a lack of agreement on Antarctica and the
increasing severity of international incidents, 123 and
undoubtably buoyed by the successful international cooperation
122Several of the claimant governments expressed serious
concern in regard to the Soviet wish to participate in an
Antarctic agreement. Most were strongly inclined to reject the
Soviet assertion that she had a "right to attend" because of
her "historic" interest in the area. The general feeling was
that only States having a "legal" title or right should be
entitled to participate. Only Argentina (and Chile, by means
of a public statement) replied to the Soviet memorandum. In
parallel statements the two countries categorically rejected
any "right" of the U.S.S.R. to claim territory or to
participate in a discussion of Antarctic problems, and
reaffirmed the validity of their own territorial claims. The
other interested States agreed with the United States view that
there was "nothing to be gained" by replying to the Soviet
memorandum. Id. at 446-47.
1230n February 1, 1952, an Argentine party in Hope Bay
opened fire with a machine gun over a British landing party
attempting to occupy a Falkland Islands Dependencies station
which had been destroyed by fire in 1948. Diplomatic
correspondence regarding this incident, which could "only be
regarded as an excess of zeal in the defence of the national
territory" by Argentina is in the Polar Record . Vol. 7, No. 48,
July 1954, pp. 212-226. Id.
The resumption of interest by Chile was in connection with
her efforts to settle another incident, this time involving
conflicting Argentine-British-Chilean claims to Deception
Island in the South Orkneys, south of the tip of South America.
The incident occurred in February 1953 when British forces
destroyed Argentine and Chilean huts on one part of the island
and removed Argentine personnel . News of this incident reached
Chile and Argentina when President Peron was in Chile on a
good-will visit, a fact which allowed close co-ordination of
the responses of the two countries to the British action. The
protests were nearly identical, and both countries also
rejected the standing British offer to take the dispute to the
International Court. Id. . at 447-448.
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during the International Geophysical Year (July 1957-December
1958)
,
124 the birth of the Antarctic Treaty truly commenced in
1958 with an initiative proposed by the British Foreign Office
which revived the U.S. "consortium" proposal of 1948-49 but,
just as importantly if not more so, included the Soviet
Union. 125 Combined with the fact that the "gentlemen's
agreement" of the International Geophysical Year to shelve all
political activity concerning Antarctica would end in December
of 1958, the time was ripe for reaching an agreement. The next
U.S. proposal in May, 1958, included the following major
points:
(1) free access to Antarctica by all
nations interested in carrying out
scientific research; (2) the growth of
scientific co-operation and exchange of
information and data among the
participating nations; (3) the use of
Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; (4)
non-militarization of the area; (5)
guaranteed rights of unilateral access and
inspection by all participating States to
all parts of Antarctica; (6) the freezing
of the legal status, so no one need
renounce any claims or rights currently
held; and (7) the creation of an
administrative unit in which all
participating States would have an equal
footing. 126
124The International Geophysical year (IGY) was a
cooperative effort lasting 18 months during 1957 and 1958 with
scientists representing 67 countries. The goal of the IGY was
to gather data for scientific analysis and assessment. See
generally S. Chapman, IGY: YEAR OF DISCOVERY (1959); Joyner,
supra note 51, at 704 n. 75.




This plan differed from the 194 8 proposal by including the
basics of Chile's "Escudero Declaration" of 1948 (which
essentially called for the establishment of a modus vivendi
arrangement for five years, during which all claims and rights
in territory south of 60° South latitude would be frozen and
scientific cooperation encouraged) 127 and by calling for non-
militarization coupled with an inspection system. The
initiative, along with an invitation to attend a treaty
conference, was delivered to all other participants in the IGY
activities in Antarctica, 128 thus acknowledging at least
tacitly the existence of a valid Soviet interest in
Antarctica's future. While several nations voiced some concern
with certain parts of the U.S. proposal, 129 these differences
were not of such magnitude as to hinder future discussion. By
June 4, 1958, all eleven nations had agreed to participate in
the proposed treaty conference.
Sixty preparatory meetings were held between June 13, 1958
and October 13, 1959 to discuss, informally and confidentially,
the specific wordings of the draft treaty provisions. 130
Despite numerous problems basically generated by sovereignty
127 Id. at 440 n. 20, at 441.
128Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the
United Kingdom.




and economic concerns, 131 the desire to effect an agreement
resulted in considerable progress, culminating in the meeting
of the Antarctic Treaty Conference in Washington, D.C. on
October 15, 1959.
The conference delegates worked very quickly, conducting
131Hanessian referred to several serious problems that
hindered progress toward agreement:
(1) strong national feeling in Argentina and Chile.
Although both were agreeable to further
scientific co-operation in Antarctica and that
the region should be used only for peaceful
purposes, both were opposed to any relinquishing
of their claims. The September 1958 election
campaign in Chile also complicated the question,
as the Washington Antarctic discussions were an
explosive topic;
(2) the reluctance of Australia, Argentina and Chile
to accept any proviso for an international
administrative body;
(3) opposition to the principle of demilitarization,
with its corollaries of inspection and control;
(4) disagreement on the zone of application for the
treaty
;
(5) the question of economic exploitation;
(6) membership in the treaty conference. Although
the U.S.S.R. and Japan pushed for the widest
possible participation, Australia asked for a
limited group. The United Kingdom was agreeable
to the accession of a wide range of States to a
general agreement, but wanted a limitation in
the number of countries involved in the actual
administrative arrangements. The United States
suggested that the treaty participants be kept
to the minimum of the twelve States, since it
felt that even that number would prove
cumbersome in the actual treaty preparations.
Some nations felt that India should be asked to
participate because of its United Nations
proposals. Others felt that if India were
invited to join that the U.S.S.R. would bring in




discussions in private deliberations. 132 Major areas of
contention during the drafting sessions centered around (1) the
area of geographical delimitation; (2) matters of jurisdiction
and settlement of disputes; and (3) the provisions governing
accession to the Treaty. By mid-November a key agreement was
reached on an inspection system to assure against unauthorized
military activity. 133 Preliminary agreement was also, perhaps
surprisingly, reached on the banning of all nuclear explosions
on the continent: this area was sought to be avoided in the
Treaty by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but its inclusion was
demanded by the Southern Hemisphere nations. 134
After six weeks of intensive negotiations and numerous
meetings, the Final Act and the completed Treaty were both
signed in Washington on December 1, 1959, following the fourth
plenary session. The Treaty as originally established
designated its twelve original signatories as Consultative
Parties, and seven of these were claimant nations. 135
Described as one of the most important international agreements
signed by all the "great Powers" since World War II, 136 the
132 Id. at 466.
133 Id. at 467.
13 *Id.
135Joyner, supra note 51, at 704 n. 82. The claimant
states are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand,
Norway, and the United Kingdom.
136Hanessian, supra note 106, at 468.
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Treaty specifically outlaws military activity, 137 nuclear
explosions, 138 and the disposal of radioactive wastes in the
continent, 139 while calling for the promotion of scientific
cooperation. 140 Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of
this paper, Article IV of the Treaty "freezes" the subject of
territorial claimancy in Antarctica, effectively suspending
determination of the validity of any national claims. 141 The
importance of this Article will be addressed infra . The Treaty
has been cited by the Soviet Union as "a noble mission in the
interest of all" 142 and as "probably the best example in
history of politicians and diplomats being drawn into action by
scientists", 143 on the assumption that it was the success of
international scientific collaboration during the International
Geophysical year that provided impetus to the treaty
conference
.
Through its consultative party arrangement, the Antarctic
Treaty establishes regulations for conduct on Antarctica.
Under Article IX of the Treaty, consultative parties shall
include the original twelve signatories and any other acceding
137Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, art. I.
138 Id. art. V.
139 Id.
140Id. art. III.
141Joyner, supra note 51, at 704.
142Boczek, supra note 82, at 856.
143Hambro, supra note 105, at 218.
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party which "demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by
conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such
as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of
a scientific expedition." 144 The consultative and acceding
parties will meet from time to time to exchange information,
consult on matters of common interest, and recommend to their
governments measures to further the principles and objectives
of the treaty. Such recommendations become effective when
approved by all of the contracting parties entitled to
participate in the meetings. 145 Presently, eight nations have
joined the original signatories as consultative parties:
Poland (1979) , the Federal Republic of Germany (1981) , Brazil
(1983), India (1^33V, the People's Republic of China (1985),
Uruguay (1^82)/, Italy (1987) , and the German Democratic
Republic (1987). 146 Seventeen more nations have acceded to the
Antarctic Treaty without achieving consultative party status:
Austria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Hungary,
the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of Korea,
Romania, Spain, and Sweden. 147 Since the entry into force of
the Treaty on June 23, 1961, Antarctica has, by and large, been
a continent maintained in accordance with the principles of
144Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, art. IX.
14 5ld^




"peaceful purposes, non-militiarization, and scientific
cooperation" embodied in the Preamble and Article I of the
Treaty. Although the Treaty deals with the issues of
sovereignty, demilitarization, scientific collaboration, and
conservation, it specifically does not purpose to provide a
solution to any economic problem, present or potential. While
it has been noted that the treaty conference might have been
wise to lay down some general rules for exploration and
possible exploitation, 148 purely practical considerations
stressing the need for the rapid conclusion of a successful
treaty conference may have won out. 14 ^ Indeed, it is submitted
that the noninclusion of potential economic issues and proposed
solutions thereto may prove to be one of the most important
features behind the Treaty's viability.
Concerning the issue of territorial claims, the most
important provision of the Antarctic Treaty is Article IV,
which "freezes" not only territorial claims but also the basis
upon which any state may make such claims in the future. 150
148Hambro, supra note 105, at 221.
14 *Id.
150Id. at 219. Article IV of the Treaty states:
1. Nothing contained in the present
Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting
Party of previously asserted rights of or
claims to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by
any Contracting Party of any basis of claim
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
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Perhaps crucial to this section's importance is its
prohibition, in Article IV (2) , of the assertion of either any
new claim or any enlargement of an existing claim during the
time the Treaty is in effect. 151 While there is some
controversy over what, if anything, either parties or non-
parties to the Treaty may do under this Article and still not
be in violation of the Treaty, 152 it remains true now, as it
was at the time the Treaty became effective, that the specific
structure of Article IV was necessary to accommodate the
numerous divergent interests of the consultative nations.
While the basic conflict between the claims to territorial
sovereignty and the claims to open use are felt to be
irreconcilable under traditional notions of international law
which it may have whether as a result of
its activities or those of its nationals in
Antarctica or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any
Contracting Party as regards its
recognition or non-recognition of any other
State's right of or claim or basis of claim
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2 . No acts or activities taking place
while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting,
supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or
create any rights of sovereignty in
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement
of an existing claim, to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted
while the present Treaty is in force.
151Id^
152Burton, supra note 5, at 477.
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and legal method, 153 the Treaty did succeed in at least
establishing some law, particularly between the parties, in
other than economic matters. The beauty of Article IV was
that, in preserving the legal status quo , neither claimants nor
nonclaimants were forced to compromise their positions: the
freeze left the juridical positions of the parties to further
resolution, if and when necessary, and afforded the parties a
modus vivendi based on what has been called the technique of
"deliberate ambiguity," 154 examples of which can be found in
nearly all articles of the Treaty. In its freezing of
claims/bases for claims, the Treaty may not have lived up to
some earlier hopes that, as a result of the Treaty, the claims
issue might die a natural death, 155 but it has succeeded in
putting a major source of international conflict in the
background and "on hold" for a relatively long period of time.
The question that now presents itself is whether or not the
Treaty and its deliberate ambiguity will be able to maintain
its validity, effectiveness, and acceptance as the basis for a
legitimate Antarctic regime.
The discussion now turns to the validity of the Antarctic
Treaty regime, which perforce requires an examination of the
position of the Antarctic Treaty in international law. There
can be no question that, as between the consultative and
153 Id. at 478.
154 Id.
155Hanessian, supra note 106, at 470.
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acceding parties (collectively referred to as contracting
parties) to the Treaty, the Treaty is international law and
thus binding on all parties. 156 The more intriguing question
is whether or not the Treaty is binding on non-parties. While
a major Soviet textbook on international law had once expressed
the opinion that the Antarctic Treaty must be considered valid
eraa omnes (essentially, binding on all), 157 this position is
considered to be in the minority and has basically been
repudiated by the majority of commentators as well as by the
leading Soviet international lawyer, Professor Tunkin, who
represented the Soviet Union at the 1959 Antarctic Treaty
Conference in Washington, D.C. 158 A number of attacks have
been made on the legality of the Antarctic Treaty and its
subordinate agreements (collectively characterized as the
Antarctic Treaty System) 159 insofar as they purport to
156Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) , T.S. No.
933 (effective Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter or
Statute of the ICJ, as appropriate].
157Boczek, supra note 82, at 856 n. 145.
158Simma, The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing For
an "Objective Regime" . 19 Cornell Int'l. L.J. 189 (1986).
159It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to deal
extensively with the four subordinate agreements, namely the
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
Flora, adopted June 2-13, 1964, [1966] 11 U.S.T. 991, 996
T.I.A.S. No. 6058, the Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals, adopted June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S.
No. 8826, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
marine Living Resources, done May 20, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 10,240
(entered into force Apr. 7, 1982) and the recent Convention on
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources, adopted at
Wellington, N.2. as the Final Act of the Fourth Special
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establish control over the continent160 and keep such control
limited to members of the "Antarctic Club." 161 Adopting the
position that the Treaty was not valid eraa omnes . in 1964 the
"Group of 77", composing a majority voting bloc of developing
countries within the United Nations, 162 initiated the concept
of the "New International Economic Order" (NEO), 163 which
postulated that a redistribution of world wealth was in order
(from industrialized nations to developing countries) to
promote a more equitable allocation of economic resources.
This theory gained greater acceptance, and increased adherents
(including some developed countries), 164 in the early 1980s
after a similar concern for economic equity arose with the
prospect of deep seabed mining becoming a reality for several
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting on June 2, 1988 and to be
opened for signature for one year, beginning November 25, 1988.
They are merely listed here for convenience and reference.
Their existence, however, and in particular the existence and
specifics of the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resources, will be dealt with more extensively in a
later section.
160Parriott, supra note 7, at 88.
161Simma, supra note 158, at 209.
162Kindt, supra note 34, at 41.
163 Id. at 41 n. 94. The doctrine of the New Economic
Order was promulgated in the Declaration on the Establishment
of a New International Economic Order (New Economic Order
Declaration), G.A. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) . The New Economic Order Declaration
was to be implemented by the Programme of Action on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3202, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1979)
164 Id. at 41.
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industrialized nations. The NEO has been strongly supportive
of the notion that all world resources beyond national
jurisdiction should be the "common heritage of mankind" and not
subject to national appropriation: finding its roots in 1967
in a speech by the Honorable Mr. Arvid Pardo, Ambassador from
Malta, to the United Nations General Assembly where it was then
declared that the wealth of the oceans should be the "common
heritage of mankind," 165 it was a relatively simple step to
extend such rationale to the continent of Antarctica where,
even amongst the consultative parties, there was sharp
disagreement over Antarctica with regard to its status as terra
nullius or terra communis . 166 Accordingly, the NEO could
easily provide support for the "open use" principle advocated
by the non-claimants in Antarctica and not be inconsistent with
its "common heritage of mankind" approach to future resource
exploitation. Based upon the results of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973 and its
resulting 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS
Convention)
,
167 an argument could be made for the similar
resolution of the future of Antarctica, consistent with "common
heritage" principles.
16522 U.N. GAOR, C.l (1515th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1515 (1969)? see U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967); U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 135, at 27 (1967).
166See notes 50-61, supra . and accompanying text.
167Done Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982) [hereinafter LOS Convention].
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Another attack that arose from non-Treaty nations was one
criticizing the validity of all territorial claims in that such
claims were the vestiges of a colonial era whose time had long
since passed and, more importantly, had been replaced by the
decolonization of the modern world. 168 The colonial premise
for territorial claims was seen as discredited, as were the
theories of discovery, military superiority, and territorial
contiguity. 169 Antarctica, lacking a native population, was
argued to be an environment analogous to the high seas and deep
seabed, and thus amenable to the common heritage approach and
belonging to the international community as a whole. 170 A
parallel analysis was made asserting the invalidity of any
claims to either a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or
continental shelf rights, and suggesting a preemption of any
such claims by the provisions of UNCLOS III. 171
Based on an initiative by Malaysia, the "question of
Antarctica" was included on the agenda of the U.N. General
Assembly in 1983. This move was viewed with concern by the
Treaty parties, and seen by many as a challenge to the validity
of the Antarctic "regime" (i.e., the administration of the
continent in accordance with the Treaty and its subordinate
168Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the U.N. . 19
Cornell Int'l. L.J. 275 (1986), at 280.
169 Id. at 280 n. 28-30.
170Id. n. 31.
171Id. at 281, at 281 n. 36.
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agreements). 172 It became incumbent upon the Treaty nations to
justify the validity of the Treaty regime, or to at least
prepare a collective defense.
Non-treaty nations are strongly challenging the Antarctic
regime. These nations want a share of the potential resources
of Antarctica without having to assume the costs of Treaty
membership. They refuse to accept the present territorial
claims, are against any third-party-effect of the Treaty, and
oppose the bi-level participation structure in the Treaty ('nur
wer kann. darf " . or, "only those who can, may"). These nations
are trying to renegotiate the Antarctica regime in the United
Nations. 173
In this regard, probably the most substantial assault upon
the regime has been on its control of decision-making in
Antarctica. Decision-making power is conferred upon the twenty
Consultative Parties—the twelve original parties to the Treaty
and the eight states that have acceded to the Treaty and have
acquired the status of Consultative Parties. Consultative
Party status is conferred through unanimous recognition by
existing Consultative Parties that the acceding nation has
conducted substantial scientific research on the continent.
Non-Consultative Parties do not enjoy decision-making power.
The negotiations on the proposed mineral resources regime were
172 Id. at 277; Colson, U.S. Position in Antarctica . 19
Cornell Int'l. L. J. 291 (1986), at 299; Kindt, supra note 34,
at 44.
173Simma, supra note 158, at 208.
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also restricted to the Consultative Parties as far as decision-
making was concerned.
During the U.N. debates, Malaysia took issue with the
distinction between Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties,
contending that it was undemocratic, going "against the grain
of current international reality," since the requirement of
"substantial scientific research activities" in Antarctica goes
beyond the means of most states. Other developing nations
expressed similar dissatisfaction. 174 Perhaps most to the
point in this criticism was Malaysia's questioning "whether any
group of countries should confer upon itself the moral and




Despite the criticisms of the Antarctic Treaty system,
there exist a number of factors which support its legitimacy to
administer Antarctica under international law. Even its
critics have acknowledged the success of the Treaty regime in
scientific cooperation and research, non-militarization, and
the preservation of the continent for peaceful purposes. 176
There exists some thought that, whatever the validity vis-a-vis
non-parties the Treaty may or may not have, the Antarctic
regime is "morally and legally" called upon to ensure the
174Hayashi, supra note 168, at 222 n. 46.
175Id. n. 47.




establishment of a minerals regime consistent with the
principles and purposes of the Treaty. 177 To impose a "legal"
requirement, and thus an obligation, on the Treaty parties
arguably implies the acknowledgement of a right to take the
actions necessary to carry out and administer that obligation
in the fulfillment of the duty.
Additionally, it appears that any challenge mounted by the
United Nations against the validity of a pre-existing treaty
(here, the Antarctic Treaty) would fall short of success. This
position has been espoused by Professor Kindt, who concludes
that the basic legal principle of formulating treaties - pacta
sunt servanda - is certainly valid, and is especially so when
the treaty in question is open to any nation wishing to become
a party. While a nation may claim a de iure-de facto
distinction concerning consultative party status, the fact
remains that basic membership is still open to technologically-
unsophisticated countries. Furthermore, he reasoned, there is
nothing in international law which would prohibit such a two-
tiered system, the most obvious example of the validity of such
being the United Nations' system itself. 178 Several other
factors point to the validity of the Treaty itself under
international law: neither the Vienna Convention on the Law of
l77Id,
178See Kindt, supra note 34.
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Treaties (Treaty on Treaties) 179 nor the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Lav180 authorize a third party or group of
third parties to challenge the validity of an existing treaty.
It can be argued, in fact, that nothing precludes any rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third party as
customary international law, when recognized as such. 181 In
light of the foregoing, it can be argued that the Treaty either
embodied customary international law at the time it took effect
or, perhaps more persuasively, that since 1961 the Treaty
provisions have become recognized (most strongly, for lack of
protest and/or acquiescence) as customary international law and
thus are now binding on non-parties as well as parties. 182 An
analysis under Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice supports this rationale. Assuming as a basic
premise that the sources of international law are:
a. international conventions,
b. customary international law,
c. the general legal principles of civilized
nations, and
d. the teachings of publicists who expose the
law, 183
179Id. at 45 n. 124; Opened for signature . May 23, 1968,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (May 12, 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
7679 (1969).
180Id. at 46 n. 125.
181Id. at 46 n. 126.
182 Id. at 46.
183 ICJ, supra note 156.
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as soon as the Antarctic Treaty and any subsequent treaties on
Antarctic resources enter into force, the law embodied in the
Antarctic Treaty system undoubtedly constitutes not only
international law per se . but also the primary "source" of
international law relating to Antarctic areas. With regard to
the second source of international law, persuasive arguments
could be made that the international agreements comprising the
Antarctic Treaty system: (1) reflected customary international
law when they were negotiated, (2) codified the existing
customary international law when they entered into force, (3)
were subjected to little or no challenges over long periods of
time, and (4) ripened over time to become customary
international law. 184
It has been consistently maintained by the consultative
parties that the administration of Antarctica under the Treaty
has been not only valid under international law but also just,
reasonable, and effective. 185 The basis for this position has
been founded in both principles of international law and in
considerations of equity. 186 Despite the attacks on the
Antarctic Treaty System and its administrative regime, it has
so far been a success and its existence appears to have an
184Kindt, supra note 34, at 61.
185Hayashi, supra note 168, at 283.
186Equitable considerations have been specifically cited




adequate foundation in international law to establish its
legitimacy.
IV. THE PRESENT TERRITORIAL CLAIMS PROBLEM
To present the issue as the present territorial claims
problem is somewhat misleading, because it is not so much a
question of the existence, validity, or present effect of
territorial claims as it is a question of the cumulative effect
of, and potential for, territorial claims in Antarctica's
future. The problem, however, is one of the present because
the Treaty itself, by freezing the claims/rights to claims
issue in 1961, did not resolve the situation so much as it held
it in abeyance.
It would be an understatement to say that the world of
today is not the world of 1961. It has been the total spectrum
of changing world conditions, and specifically the increased
competition for resources, which has heightened international
awareness of Antarctica's economic potential and has made the
issue of the control of both real and potential Antarctic
resources a major international concern. The Antarctic Treaty
may have resolved the issue of territorial claims at its time,
but in its not addressing economic resource issues, 188 the
"problem" still exists and has in fact been aggravated with the
passage of time.
188See note 148, supra .
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There are several factors which have led to a call for the
reassessment of the Antarctic Treaty regime. The emergence of
the NEO, 189 with its resistance to anything that looks like
colonialism, is certainly a major factor. In a similar fashion
the Group of 77' s position on deep seabed mining at UNCLOS III
and its promotion of the "common heritage of mankind" idea also
call into question the validity of a minority of nations
exercising total control over a whole continent which,
depending on your position, is either terra nullius or terra
communis . 19 ° Despite some important distinctions between the
deep seabed and Antarctica, 191 the general concept of global
189Discussed at notes 162-65 supra . and accompanying text.
See also Pinto, The International Community in Antarctica . 33
Miami L. Rev. 475 (1978), at 480.
190Burton, supra note 5, at 501.
191This distinction has been made:
The principal factual difference, of course, is
that Antarctica is a continent, not seabed. Even the
Antarctic continental shelf differs in important ways
from the deep seabed. in Antarctica, claims to
territorial sovereignty have been made and the right
to make such claims in the future has been reserved
by several states. Moreover, these claimed rights
derive from substantial investments in Antarctica
over a period of decades, premised in part on the
possibility of acquiring territorial sovereignty. No
such basis exists for any activities undertaken on
the deep seabed.
The most significant difference may be a legal
one. No basis exists for believing that any nation
had Antarctica in mind when voting for the LOS
Convention and its Declaration of Principles even
though the words of the resolution can be applied
logically to Antarctica. One surely cannot suppose
that such logic would lead any state to forego its
claimed national rights in Antarctica. An
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sharing has not fallen into international disfavor192 but has,
if anything, gained momentum.
Another major factor has been the fast-growing belief that
Antarctica's living and nonliving resources may be worth much
more than previously imagined. Times have definitely changed
since the day when a famous geologist declared that he "would
not give a nickel for all the resources of Antarctica." 193 It
has been said that no other activity undertaken in Antarctica
today has posed a threat to territorial claims comparable to
the threat posed by minerals exploitation. 194 This feeling
must be amplified when living resources are added to the
equation, and when such a major threat is posed to the
territorial claims issue it is necessarily of equal importance
to the future of the Antarctic Treaty regime. While the extent
of Antarctic resources is difficult to assess, it can at least
be said that abundant supplies of living resources are
available. From a commercial standpoint, the most promising
among them is krill (Euphausia superba ) . Krill are small
interpretation of the resolution as applying the
principle of the common heritage to Antarctica bears
no relationship to the genuine shared expectations of
states at the time of adoption or thereafter. The
resolution, lacking intent, therefore has no effect
in Antarctica. Id. . at 501 n. 275.
192Parriott, supra note 7, at 94.
193Testimony of Mr. Laurence Gould, Hearing before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 2d
Session, June 1960.
194Francioni, supra note 54, at 179.
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shrimp-like crustaceans rich in protein. The Southern Ocean
supports a standing stock of krill estimated between 153
million and 6.6 billion metric tons, of which 30 million to 1
billion metric tons could be harvested annually without adverse
effect. Considering that the total fish catch worldwide is
approximately 60 to 70 million tons annually, Antarctic krill
constitute a major potential food source. Although numerous
practical problems remain to be solved before it becomes
economically profitable, large-scale krill harvesting is
already technologically feasible. 195 Krill has been of special
interest to the Soviet Union, which has pioneered krill
fishing, research, technology, and marketing. 196 Relatively
abundant stocks of seals, whales, fish, cepalopods
(octopus/squid) and cetaceans also exist in the Antarctic
regions. 197
Speculation about the existence of mineral resources, both
onshore and offshore, in Antarctica has fueled a major interest
in both resource exploitation and allocation. While
traditional minerals such as coal, copper, lead, gold, nickel,
silver, platinum, and uranium are known to exist in
195Parriott, supra note 7, at 72 n. 26-32.
196For more than 10 years (1961-1971) , the Soviet Union
was the only krill-fishing nation; it was later joined by
Japan, Poland, West Germany, Chile, Taiwan and a few other
states. Boczek, supra note 82, at 847.
197Parriott, supra note 7, at 72-73.
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Antarctica, 198 the main interest is in the possible existence
of large supplies of hydrocarbons (deposits of oil and natural
gas). 199 It has been estimated that for the Ross, Weddell, and
Bellingshausen Seas around Antarctica there are 45 billion
barrels of petroleum and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas, based upon surveys made in 1973 by the U.S. research
vessel GLOMAR CHALLENGER. 200 Even though such hydrocarbon
exploitation is still no more than a potential, 201 it has
raised serious questions about the inevitable pollution
accompanying hydrocarbon retrieval and the resultant danger to
the fragile Antarctic environment. The 1988 Convention on the
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources (hereinafter 1988
Convention) represents an attempt to address this issue, but in
that it is a part of the Antarctic Treaty System it begs the
question to state that the 1988 Convention is a valid effort
under international law to administer the problem. Its
validity outside the sphere of the Treaty parties (assuming,
for the moment, that the 1988 Convention is in fact made
effective by the signature of sixteen consultative parties
198 Id. at 74.
199Id. at 75; Boczek, supra note 82, at 850.
200Auburn, supra note 1, at 244-45.
201Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resources, supra note 159.
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after November 25, 1988) 202 must rise or fall with the validity
of the Antarctic Treaty itself.
Other potential resource issues that have developed in
Antarctica since 1961 are, while comparatively minor, still
factors in the total picture of economic potential that have
contributed to the need to reassess the U.S. position
concerning the Antarctic Treaty regime in general and the issue
of territorial claims in particular. One "21st century"
project203 is the possible harvesting of icebergs as a means to
provide fresh water to the more arid regions of the world.
Another is the recovery of manganese nodules from offshore.
While the Antarctic nodules have proven generally to be of
poorer quality than those found near the equator, 204 they are a
retrievable mineral resource whose economic potential cannot be
dismissed.
Increased attention to several other aspects has also
brought the legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty regime into the
international spotlight. The advances in modern technology,
both for scientific and economic purposes, since 1961 have
202 Id. art. 62. As of November 26, 1988, nine nations
(Brazil, Finland, South Korea, Norway, South Africa, Sweden,
USSR, Uruguay, and New Zealand) had signed the Convention.
Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1988, at A20, col. 1.
203Parriott, supra note 7, at 75.
204 Id. at 74. A manganese nodule is a small, potato-
sized object basically containing commercially interesting
qualities of nickel, copper, cobalt, any manganese. See




certainly provided great impetus to this issue. It is believed
that the technology of Arctic offshore developments in oil and
gas exploitation can be transferred to the Antarctic region,
with some modification, to make hydrocarbon resource recovery
an economic reality. 205 Successful efforts in the Arctic have
already been made at towing small icebergs, with technology
used for protecting Arctic oil rigs and drilling gear from
passing icebergs. 206 The value of Antarctica for scientific
purposes has always been recognized, and has increased since
scientists have begun using Antarctica as a standard of
comparison for the detection of interplanetary life. 207 While
"pure" scientific research is often difficult to distinguish
from related economic exploration and/or research, it is
nonetheless another force exerting pressure on the Antarctic
regime
.
Historically, the strategic significance of Antarctica has
been minimal, apparently more dictated by negative concerns of
blocking any other nation's attempts to gain an advantage in
Antarctica than by affirmative motivation to actively include
Antarctica as part of an overall national security plan. This
205Auburn, supra note 1, at 248. In the next two or three
/ears, Norway expects to develop the technological capability
co drill on the very deep contitental shelf. Parriott, supra
note 7, at 109.
206Attempts to transport icebergs of even a moderate size
ire only in the experimental stage. When a 292,000 ton berg
*as harnessed off Eastern Canada, it appeared to be a case of
-he iceberg towing the ship. Id. at 249 n. 52.
207 Id. at 1.
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has been particularly so of the United States, and apparently
that of the Soviet Union as well. 208 The same approach cannot
be said to have been followed by Chile and Argentina (and,
possibly, Australia) whose relative proximity to Antarctica
gave rise to more tenable security interests, 209 but the
potential of conflict in this regard seems to have been put on
hold by the Treaty. Back in 1948, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff stated that Antarctica had no strategic value at all. 210
It is submitted that this position is easily subject to change,
depending upon the volatility of the world political situation,
any increase in small-scale armed conflict, and in no small
measure upon the termination of the Antarctic Treaty: all the
original (1959) "negative" strategic concerns would resurface
and most probably be aggravated by an Antarctic "land rush" to
establish and/or strengthen territorial claims. 211
The potential for Antarctic habitation, once unthinkable
due to the harsh environmental conditions on the continent, has
also increased with time and technology. Chile and Argentina
have traditionally maintained settlements on the Antarctic
Peninsula, with continuing efforts to make these areas as much
208See generally Boczek, supra note 82.
209Auburn, supra note 1, at 55-61.
210J. Myhre, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW,
AND DIPLOMACY (1986), at 26.
211 Id,. at 27. For an interesting analysis of a similar
problem during the California Gold Rush, see Umbeck, A Theory
of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush . 20 J.L. &
Econ. 421 (1977). Burton, supra note 5, at 496 n. 121.
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a part of the mainland as possible212 and to raise
international cognizance concerning the strengths of their
respective interests in the continent. Currently, thirteen
nations and one nongovernmental organization (Greenpeace)
operate year-round stations with "winter over" personnel on the
Antarctic continent. Several nations, including the United
States, the Soviet Union, Argentina, Australia, Chile, and New
Zealand, make extensive use of their military forces, in
accordance with the Treaty, 213 to support their scientific and
research missions.
The United States has consistently maintained the largest
program in Antarctica. It operates three year-round stations:
McMurdo (formerly Naval Air Facility, McMurdo until 1961) , the
logistics center on Ross Island; Amundsen-Scott, at the
geographic South Pole; and Palmer, on Anvers Island off the
western coast of the Antarctic Peninsula. Also operational are
three austral-summer camps: Siple Station, in Ellsworth Land,
at the base of the Antarctic Peninsula; Byrd Surface Camp, in
Marie Byrd Land; and Marble Point Camp. 214 The U.S. Antarctic
program, while heavily dependent on U.S. military logistic
212 Id. at 13; Auburn, supra note 1, at 59-61. In response
to a private Brazilian venture planning an expedition to the
Antarctic Peninsula, the President and Cabinet of Argentina
flew to Argentina's Marambio Base in Antarctica, proclaiming
the base to be the temporary capital of Argentina and
conducting government business there as a show of sovereignty.
Id.
213Antarctic Treaty, supra note 54, art. I.
214Scott, supra note 94, at 30-31.
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support, is funded and controlled by the National Science
Foundation, an independent U.S. government agency. Additional
support is provided by the government of New Zealand pursuant
to a joint cooperative agreement on Antarctic operations. 215
It is clear that the technology and facilities now exist to
make Antarctica an area subject to year-round habitation. Such
habitation may be, if not required, at least conducive to
efficient economic exploration and exploitation in the future.
As resources exploitation becomes a reality, so does the
concept of Antarctica being amenable to being called "home" , at
least by some.
Finally, the growing concern with Antarctica is
inextricably tied to the burgeoning interest in the law of the
sea and, particularly, in the resource exploitation of the seas
and the deep seabed. Assuming arcruendo that UNCLOS III and its
LOS Convention reflect principles of customary international
law in the treatment of the territorial sea, the high seas, the
continental shelf, the contiguous zone, and the exclusive
economic zone, 216 the "law of the sea" presupposes the
existence of a coastal state in order to exercise legislative
and/or enforcement authority at sea. 217 The problem, of
course, is that the Treaty freezes the issue of territorial
215Id.
216See Oxman, The New Law of the Sea . ABA Journal vol. 69
(Feb. 1983), at 156-62.
2170xman, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea . 19 Cornell
Int'l L. J. 211 (1986), at 222.
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sovereignty by nonrecognition and thereby technically negates
any coastal state claims in Antarctica. Thus, the traditional
notions of coastal state authority are nonexistent there.
Although the LOS Convention did not purport to extend its
jurisdiction to Antarctica, 218 and the pre-existing Treaty
applies to all activities south of 60° South latitude
(excepting high seas freedoms and activities seaward of the
Antarctic continental shelf), 219 the terra nullius/communis
controversy again surfaces to question the validity of any
Antarctic Treaty regime assertion of jurisdiction in offshore
matters. An argument can be made that if Antarctica were
considered res communis . instead of terra nullius . the
Antarctic area would not be subject to appropriation by states
because the entire area would by definition lie beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction: under Article I of the LOS
Convention, the term "Area" is defined as "the sea bed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." Thus, the continental shelf of Antarctica would
become part of the "Area." By analogy, the Antarctic continent
could also be considered part of the "Area." The Southern
Ocean surrounding Antarctica would accordingly become "high
seas" under the LOS Convention. The application of the LOS
Convention to the Antarctic area as res communis would
therefore result in the International Seabed Authority (ISA)
218Parriott, supra note 7, at 94 n. 194
2190xman, supra note 217, at 236.
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regulating Antarctica and the Antarctic continental shelf, and
in the Southern Ocean being designated as high seas. 220 The
potential for resource exploitation off the coast of the
Antarctic continent and the NEO movement toward "global
sharing" demand a resolution concerning the control of
Antarctic offshore resources. The Group of 77, opposed to any
appearance of colonialism, would not be happy with the prospect
of being cut off from the economic benefits of Antarctica by
the maintenance of the status quo in Antarctica which, while
not specifically addressing economic concerns, leaves all
decision-making to the consultative parties. 221 Neither, it
might be added, would this prospect be satisfactory to any
other non-consultative parties. As the demand for a share of
these resources increases, the inability of the present
Antarctic administrative regime (as presently structured) to
accommodate these demands becomes more evident. This potential
conflict may be even more aggravating in the offshore areas
than on the continent itself due to the relatively greater ease
of access to offshore resources. 222 As Professor Oxman sagely
points out, the underlying juridical question here is whether a
certain number of nation-states may, under international law,
establish a regulatory regime in Antarctica which binds all
220Parriott, supra note 7, at 96.
221Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, art. IX.
222See Kindt, note 34 supra ; Auburn, note 1 supra ;
Parriott, note 7 supra ; Burton, note 5 supra .
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other states. 223 Oxman postulates that the absence of
territorial sovereignty by any one state is not necessarily
dispositive of the question of whether a suitable group of
states may exercise collectively the off-shore rights that
international law normally vests in the coastal state, and
suggests that certain states (in this case, the consultative
parties) have collective rights applicable eraa omnes to
establish regulatory regimes for both the Antarctic continent
and the offshore areas that, under international law, would
otherwise be subject to coastal state jurisdiction, even if no
consultative party has perfected a sovereignty claim over the
land territory in question, in accordance with the established
doctrine of condominium: whatever the merits of the parties'
claims inter sese . their rights collectively are superior to
those of the rest of the world. Oxman also suggested that this
collective authority could be rooted in the theory that the
parties, given their historic role in Antarctica, have a
special collective responsibility to establish such a
regulatory regime, particularly in light of the elaborate
duties imposed by the new law of the sea to conserve living
resources and to protect and preserve the marine
environment. 224 This theory highlights the basic rationale for
the Antarctic Treaty regime as it currently exists: its
validity, as Professor Oxman concedes, is dependent upon one's
2230xman, supra note 217, at 223.
224 Id. at 223; see also Kindt, supra note 34, at 54.
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view of the status of the land areas from which such
jurisdiction is measured, 225 thus returning us full circle to
the initial question of the legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty
regime. Many nations will not accept this condominium
approach, 226 and whereas in 1961 the issue of the. control of
Antarctica does not appear to have been the concern of a
majority of world nations, it presently is a major
international issue due, in general, to the passage of time,
scientific/technological advances, and in particular to the
increased awareness of the utility and value of Antarctica in
relation to basic international needs.
V. U.S. OPTIONS CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS PROBLEM
At the present time the U.S. finds itself in a position
where the protection of its interests in Antarctica is coming
under increasing attack, both from outside the treaty regime as
well as from within. As the potential for living and mineral
resource exploitation become more of a reality, the need of
those nations with a real or expected stake in Antarctica to
protect their individual interests has increased the potential
for international conflict. Sovereign nations within the
Treaty regime will be forced to ensure their current
investments in the continent are not washed away either by the
expiration of the Treaty or by application of the principles of
225Id. at 236.
226Auburn, supra note 1, at 117-120.
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UNCLOS III, and those nations not members of the "Antarctic
Club" 227 will make every effort to gain a piece of Antarctica's
economic pie, either as a result of international acceptance of
the "common heritage" concept vis a vis Antarctica or, in the
alternative, of successfully asserting that Antarctica was, and
still is, terra nullius . that the Treaty prevented any inchoate
territorial claims from ripening, and that therefore all
sovereign nations will now be able to make a territorial claim
in Antarctica: indeed, a successful corollary to the above
argument may be that, since non-parties are not bound by the
"freeze" provisions of Article IV, 228 any non-party could in
theory stake its claim to Antarctica as soon as it could get
there (for some nations, that may mean immediately) . Even if
it is conceded that the Treaty parties have a "special
relationship" with Antarctica, 229 this relationship is merely
one of the bargaining chips that will be brought to any
negotiating table. It is apparent that a crucial stage in both
the economic and political development of Antarctica is
imminent, and it is time to consider what changes and
adaptations are necessary in U.S. Antarctic policy to safeguard
the future of the United States stake in the continent.
While U.S. Antarctic policy leading up to the Antarctic
227Simma, supra note 158, at 209.
228Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53.
229See notes 223-24 supra and accompanying text.
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Treaty may have been inconsistent, 230 the most recent post-
Treaty pronouncements have indicated a growing movement to
protect U.S. interests. 231 The position of the United States
in three general areas regarding Antarctica has been summarized
as follows:
A. POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS
—to reserve Antarctica for activities that
serve peaceful purposes only;
—to prevent Antarctica from becoming the scene
or object of international discord;
—to continue the peaceful and cooperative
relationships regarding Antarctica among those States
active there;
—to preserve United States access to all areas
of Antarctica and surrounding marine areas for
peaceful purposes, regardless of territorial or other
claims; and
—to preserve any basis for a United States
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica that
existed prior to the entry into force of the
Antarctic Treaty.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTERESTS
—to protect and maintain the Antarctic
environment, including the ecological systems of the
continent and southern ocean;
—to increase understanding of the role natural
processes play in Antarctic phenomena of global
significance, including biological, geological,
geophysical, meteorological, and oceanographic
processes
;
230Parriott, supra note 7, at 104-05. Parriott's article
does imply that Antarctic policy still vacillates with the
political winds, but the evidence indicates to this writer a





—to increase scientific understanding of global
processes that can be better understood as a result
of evidence available in Antarctica (e.g. , worldwide
dispersal patterns of man-introduced pollutants and
upper atmosphere physics)
;
—to increase baseline data and information on
marine and terrestrial areas within the Antarctic
Treaty area; and
—to maintain the freedom of scientific research
in Antarctica and the cooperative sharing of data
gathered in accordance with the Antarctic Treaty.
C. RESOURCE INTERESTS
—to increase knowledge of the living resources
in Antarctica and their ecological systems;
—to conserve the living resources of Antarctica
and the southern ocean ensuring the health of
individual populations and their ecological systems;
—to participate in the development and
implementation of management mechanisms for
conserving the living resources of Antarctica;
—to provide access for United States nationals
to harvest living resources, in accordance with
agreed conservation objectives and measures, should
such harvesting interests develop;
—to increase knowledge of the non-living
resource potential of Antarctica and of the
environment in which such resources may be located;
—to ensure that any mineral resource activities
are environmentally acceptable;
—to facilitate an increase in the global supply
of mineral resources through:
(a) defining rights to Antarctic mineral
resources ; and
(b) ensuring reasonable conditions of
investment consistent with United
States interests ; and
—to provide non-discriminatory access for the
United States to all areas of Antarctica in which
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mineral resource activities may be determined
acceptable. 232
Numerous options concerning the future administration of
Antarctica have been proposed. An excellent summary of these
options has been prepared by Dr. W.E. Westermeyer, 233 and his
in-depth analysis of the alternatives is enlightening. For the
purposes of this paper, however, U.S. options are seen as
choices between three basic plans:
1. Whether the United States should assert a
territorial claim in Antarctica;
2
.
Whether the United States should promote United
Nations administration of Antarctica; or
3. Whether the United States should support, with
any necessary modifications, the continuation of
the Antarctica Treaty regime.
A. Making a U.S. Territorial Claim in Antarctica
It has been urged in some quarters that the time has come
for the United States to make a territorial claim in
Antarctica. 234 The rationale for this position is based upon
the application of a balancing test to U.S. Antarctic
interests: preserving Antarctica for peaceful purposes only
and preventing Antarctica from becoming the scene of
international discord on one side, and U.S. environmental,
economic, and historical (read: "territorial") interests on
232Colson, supra note 172, at 291-93; Id. at 291 n. 1.
233W. Westermeyer, THE POLITICS OF MINERAL RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT IN ANTARCTICA (1984).
234Parriott, supra note 7.
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the other. 235 This view assumes that the effectiveness of the
Antarctic Treaty itself, and of the Antarctic Treaty system,
cannot protect the above-listed U.S. interests in light of the
increased awareness, and evidence, of the value of Antarctica's
potential wealth of living and mineral resources. The espousal
of such a position would first require that the U.S. withdraw
from the Treaty in accordance with Article XII, or allow the
Treaty to lapse after 30 years. 236 The suspect wisdom of this
approach will be discussed later, but at first glance there
does appear to be some basis upon which a U.S. territorial
claim based upon discovery may arguably be made. A major
drawback to the validity of any territorial claim that the
United States may make in Antarctica has been that, as
discussed earlier, 237 discovery without effective occupation
has created at best inchoate title to the land in question and,
unless perfected within a reasonable time, this title would be
235Id. . at 115.
236Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, art. XII(2)(a). If
the Treaty were allowed to lapse, its earliest potential
termination date would be 1993. The Treaty is eligible for
review in 1991, having come into effect in 1961. See Parriott,
supra note 7, at 112.
237See notes 36-40, supra . In the nineteenth century,
colonization in Africa and North America led to the acceptance
of the theory that discovery and actual occupation should be
required for the acquisition of territory and that symbolic
annexation was no longer sufficient to confer title.
Occupation and settlement, "more or less permanent," under
state sanction was required, and possession must be actual,
continuous, and useful. Article 35, Chapter VI, of the Act of
Berlin was used as the authority for this test. Auburn, supra
note 1, at 11-12, n. 58-61.
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ineffective against other claimants who had exercised acts of
sovereignty there. This traditional view, however, was
effectively relaxed in three legal decisions: The Island of
Palmas case, 238 The Clipperton Island Award, 239 and the Legal
Status of Greenland case. 240 These cases stand for the
proposition that an exception to, or relaxation of, the
traditional rule of effective occupation is to be made when the
land is essentially uninhabited, 241 and that effective
occupation in an uninhabited area is accomplished merely by
"effective administration." 242 In the Island of Palmas case,
the dispute concerned an island located between the Philippines
and the Dutch West Indies over which both the United States and
the Netherlands claimed jurisdiction. The U.S. claim to title
was derived from Spain by way of cession under the Treaty of
Paris. 243 The original Spanish claim had been based on
theories of discovery and contiguity. The Dutch claim was
founded on an assertion of peaceful and continuous display of
authority over the island. The arbitrator ruled that
manifestations of sovereignty could not be exercised in fact at
every moment on every point of a territory and that all that
238 (1932) 2 UNRIAA 1105.
239 (1928) 2 UNRIAA 829.
240 (1933) PCIJ Serv. A/B, No. 53, 22.
241Parriott, supra note 7, at 81.
242 Id. at 82 n. 104.
243Note, 9 Case W. Res. J. Int'l. L. 135 (1977) at 150.
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was required in uninhabited regions was for such manifestations
to be intermittently displayed. 244 Subsequent to the Island of
Palmas case, Mexico and France both claimed jurisdiction over a
small island located several hundred miles off the coast of
Mexico. French claims of sovereignty over the island were
based on relatively minimal acts of effective occupation.
These included a proclamation of sovereignty over the island,
an unsuccessful attempt by a French vessel to land there, and a
protest to the United States following the discovery of a group
of Americans collecting guano on the island. The Mexican case
was based on a claim of Spanish title through discovery, said
title later being inherited by Mexico through independence.
The arbitrator decided that even if a historic right existed,
it had not been continued by any subsequent act of Mexican
sovereignty. He found the island to be terra nullius and that
the French acts had been sufficient to gain sovereignty over
the island, despite the absence of any attempts to occupy
it. 245 Both cases were disputes over small islands with little
or no native population. Essentially, in both cases effective
occupation was accomplished by taking occasional steps to
exercise administration: nothing further, for all practical
purposes, was required. 246 Finally, in the Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland case, a sovereignty dispute arose in a
244Note 239, supra, at 877.
245Note 243, supra . at 151 n. 96.
246Parriott, supra note 7, at 84.
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situation more closely analogous to the Antarctic scenario.
Both Norway and Denmark claimed the eastern coast of Greenland,
an area largely uninhabited. 247 Denmark claimed that its
exercise of sovereignty over Greenland had existed
traditionally, had been continuously and peacefully displayed,
and, until this present dispute, had not been contested by any
other state. It further argued that Norway was estopped from
denying Danish sovereignty over the island because Norway had
accepted various treaties in which Danish sovereignty was
recognized. Norway contended that Denmark exercised no
actual sovereignty over the area which Norway had occupied on
July 10, 1931, and that at the time of the occupation, the area
was terra nullius . It claimed that the area lay beyond the
boundaries of the Danish colonies in Greenland and that Danish
sovereignty extended no further than the limits of these
colonies. 248 Norway also claimed that attempts made by Denmark
to obtain recognition of her position in Greenland were
inconsistent with a claim to be already in possession of the
disputed area, and that she was therefore estopped from
alleging a long-established sovereignty over the whole
island. 249
The Court, in holding for Denmark, did not use the test
developed in the Palmas case but referred to a title derived
247Note 240, supra . at 84.




from a "continued display of authority." 250 This title
involves two elements, each of which must be shown to exist:
The intention and will to act as sovereign and some actual
exercise or display of such authority. 251 The Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) held that by its acts Denmark
had established "effective occupation" over the entire
areas. 252
This trilogy of cases provides an argument that the
relaxed test of effective occupation, particularly as applied
in the Eastern Greenland case, could be applied to test the
validity of territorial claims in Antarctica due to its
uninhabited status at the times of various "discoveries" and
subsequent expeditions. Both land areas are extremely large,
relatively uninhabited, and generally inhospitable:
accordingly, the PCIJ's rationale for relaxing the requirements
for establishing effective occupation in the Greenland context
might similarly be applicable regarding Antarctica.
Sovereignty is, of course, generally exercised over people.
However, in largely uninhabited areas there seems to be no
valid reason for requiring actual settlement and possession of
the territory. Rather, all that is necessary reasonably to
establish occupation is effective administration. Assuming a






ability to guarantee some degree of minimum legal order and
protection over the territory, it should not be required of
that state to demonstrate a physical possession of every
portion of that territory. 253 Acceptance of this theory would
undoubtably justify a U.S. assertion to Antarctic territory,
based upon the early U.S. expeditions to Antarctica and
subsequent acts, symbolic and real, both of administration and
of intent to make a claim. 254 If, as Professor Auburn states,
in disputes (between two parties over Antarctic territory) "the
more active side should prevail," 255 it appears that the United
States, with traditionally the largest Antarctic operation in
the world, would generally be in an advantageous position to
claim superior territorial rights. 256
Other grounds for the assertion of a U.S. territorial
claim in Antarctica exist. It can be argued that while Article
IV of the Treaty purportedly "froze" all claims (and any basis
for claims) in 1961, there is nothing in the Treaty prohibiting
the U.S. from using activities, or bases established prior to
1961, as a basis for a claim: additionally, those U.S.
activities from 1961-1993 that continued a preexisting base or
activity/expedition would also be a viable basis for a
253Parriott, supra note 7, at 86-87.
254See notes 66-80, supra , and accompanying text. See
generally Auburn, supra note 1, at 61-78 for a concise history
of U.S. presence in Antarctica.
255Auburn, supra note 1, at 14.
256Parriott, supra note 7, at 117.
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territorial claim since they would not be "new" claims under
Article IV; similarly, assuming Treaty termination, activities
conducted after the termination date that essentially continued
the occupation of bases established either before or after 1961
could theoretically form the basis for a claim and, in reality,
it would be irrational to presume that any sovereign nation
would be inclined to surrender its "investment" (bases) in
Antarctica merely because the Treaty ended. 257 It can also be
argued that, given the termination of the Treaty, modern
technological advances have now made it possible to finally
achieve "effective occupation" in Antarctica (whereas such may
not have been generally possible before 1961) and that,
assuming arguendo no title could have been perfected prior to
1961 (due to lack of technology) , and that all claims or rights
to claims were frozen from 1961-1993, it is now possible to
perfect the inchoate claims (or rights to claims) that
previously existed. 258 That the door would be open to assert a
U.S. territorial claim upon withdrawal from or termination of
the Treaty is clear from the fact that, unless otherwise
required to do so under international law, the U.S. would no
longer be bound to fulfill any obligation contained in the
Treaty. 259 Accordingly, the U.S. (and any other nation) would
be free to make territorial claims.
257Auburn, supra note 1, at 107.
258See generally Conforti, supra note 41
259Parriott, supra note 7, at 91 n. 178.
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If a territorial claim were asserted by the United States,
such action theoretically might secure access for the U.S. to
potential Antarctic resources within the U.S. claimancy. Under
what has been called a "national model" for Antarctic
jurisdiction, the U.S. along with any other state claiming a
historic interest in Antarctica would assert its own
territorial claim. 260 Conceding that this could potentially
produce international conflict, this model nevertheless might
provide certain advantages by allowing each claimant nation to
assume "sound resource management" and conservation. 261
Additionally, this approach can be seen as an equitable
"reward" for the historically developed interests of those
nations which have taken an active role in Antarctica from the




Unfortunately, any superficial appeal of making a "land
grab" in Antarctica is outweighed by a multitude of negative
aspects that would be associated with such an action.
Initially it must be noted that the "relaxed" theory of
occupation as the basis for a legitimate territorial claim has
numerous critics. The Eastern Greenland case is not seen as
relevant precedent for the Antarctic scenario because it
allegedly did not specifically address the "effective
260Id. at 98.
261Joyner, supra note 51, at 720.
262 Id. at 720-21.
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occupation" issue but instead limited its decision to a finding
that no states had opposed Denmark's claim to the island and
that the Danish claim had in fact already been conceded in many
multilateral and bilateral agreements. Accordingly, it is
distinguishable from the Antarctic situation in which no claims
are conceded and nonrecognition of claims is the norm. 263
Furthermore, the application of the relaxed standard for
effective occupation to Antarctic claims may be questionable
because (1) these tribunals only seek to determine which of the
two parties to the proceeding has the better claim; and (2) all
three cases upheld single claims to an entire island, thus
obviating any need to draw boundaries. 264 In this light, it
may be said that any territorial claim based on the
aforementioned theory is illegitimate. It must be remembered
that the United States would be only one of a number of nations
that would be competing for territory in a "land rush" scenario
and that, whereas for all practical purposes the potential
claimants in Antarctica were relatively few in number in 1959,
this pool of claimants has greatly increased, and will
inevitably continue to increase, with technological advances
and the passage of time. Acknowledging that a major impetus
for the Antarctic Treaty was the imminence of international
conflict in 1959, 265 one must concede that increased Antarctic
263Conforti, supra note 41, at 256.
264Burton, supra note 5, at 463.
265Myhre, supra note 210, at 25-26.
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interest by many nations at present would virtually guarantee a
greater potential for conflict. It is most probable that any
attempt by the United States to make a territorial claim would
be seen by a majority of the rest of the world, and especially
the NEO/Group of 77 community, as a continuation of the
discredited notions of colonialism and roundly denounced. 266
The animosity created by such action would be compounded by
friction within the Antarctic Treaty community, because any
U.S. claim would undoubtably detract from or conflict with
other Treaty members' interests, thus escalating international
discord. At the very least, U.S. action in this regard would
surely be considered as a major affront to the sovereignty of
many nations already in Antarctica. Proponents of the "U.S.
territorial claim" concept may not see armed international
conflict as an inevitable result of such U.S. action (although
the possibility of nothing more than "minor skirmishes" is
acknowledged), 267 but such an approach appears to be too
simplistic and overly cavalier. It is believed that a more
realistic analysis of the probable consequences of the United
States making a "land grab" will conclude that the intensely
negative international political reaction makes such a course
of action impossible. It has been said that "[it would have
been] politically foolish to advance a claim [to Antarctic
266Parriott, supra note 7, at 115
267 Id. at 118.
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territory] in the late 1940s." 268 It is submitted that it
would be even more foolish now to make such an assertion.
International political opprobrium is not the only
disadvantage to be weighed in considering the possibility of
making a U.S. claim in Antarctica. In asserting any
territorial claim, the United States runs the risk of opening
the territorial claims door to other nations which may very
well have equal, or greater, claims on the continent. This is
especially true in light of the U.S.'s inconsistent Antarctic
claims policy through history. U.S. rights in Antarctica have
been seen to "rest on shaky foundation", especially in light of
the Hughes doctrine. 269 As one U.S. Government analysis
stated
:
A U.S. claim could take one of several forms.
Delineation of a U.S. claim to full sovereignty, even
if we could identify our major interests at this
time, might prove to be an abortive effort because of
the lack of internationally agreed rules for
acquiring sovereignty in the Antarctic. It would
also be a sharp break with our past policy of
refusing to recognize claims to sovereignty when not
accompanied by occupation. More important, the
principles underlying any selection of the precise
areas of superior U.S. 'rights' would be applied
elsewhere as a yardstick of comparison by other
powers, possibly to our disadvantage. Inferior U.S.
' rights x outside the area of a ' sovereignty x claim
would be impaired, at least by implication, even
though they might eventually acquire significance as
the result of further U.S. activities, or through
default by other powers. 270
268Myhre, supra note 210, at 25.
269Auburn, supra note 1, at 75.




Any territorial claim the United States could assert would
probably be in the area referred to as the "United States
sector", encompassing what is known as Marie Byrd Land and
Ellsworth Lands, and being the area between of 90° W. longitude
and the boundary of New Zealand's claim over the Ross
Dependency. 271 While this area may be tacitly recognized272 as
suitable for a U.S. claim, the problem in asserting a claim
here is that this sector is considered the least valuable and
least accessible of all Antarctic sectors, and a claim to this
area might imply a renunciation of an Antarctic claim
elsewhere. 273 Any further aggrandizement attempt (which would
logically tend toward the Ross Dependency wherein the largest
U.S. base and logistics center, McMurdo, is located) would
infringe upon (and probably swallow) the New Zealand claimancy.
As New Zealand is arguably the United States' best friend and
principal ally in Antarctic operations, 274 such a move should
be unthinkable.
Perhaps the largest problem that would be created if the
United States were to open the door to Antarctic claims is the
presence of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the history of U.S.
Antarctic policy, Soviet history on the continent has been one
271Auburn, supra note 1, at 67.
272 IcL_
273 Id.
274 Id. at 67-71.
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of consistency and expansion. 275 The U.S.S.R., presently a
nonclaimant state, has in many instances had mutual interests
and objectives with the United States in Antarctica. 276
However this would certainly disintegrate over the issue of
territorial claims since the Soviet Union, despite having no
recognized Soviet sector, has established bases in all
Antarctic sectors and is the leading nation in the exploitation
of Antarctic living resources (most significantly, krill). 277
The Soviets have also developed perhaps the largest resource
oriented geological research program in Antarctica and in
support thereof have located its stations in areas of potential
minerals interest. 278 The Soviet Union has continually taken
advantage of its opportunities to strengthen the Soviet
position for any future allocation of territory or mineral
rights, and if the Treaty's current "freeze" of claims is
jeopardized, it is clear that the Soviet Union would not sit
idly by and acquiesce to U.S. action in any areas in which the
Soviets expressed their own national interest. The same
opposition can also obviously be expected from all other
claimant states, although perhaps to a lesser degree. Thus,
assertion of a territorial claim in Antarctica by the United
States is seen to be not a cost-effective method to protect
275See notes 92-102, supra and accompanying text
276Boczek, supra note 82, at 857.




U.S. interests on the continent. The problem of the United
States' historical inaction in this area has created, if not by
some theory of equitable estoppel then by the passage of time,
a situation in which the United States has painted itself into
a corner. It cannot realistically assert a territorial claim
without jeopardizing its overall national interests. A U.S.
"land grab" would generate tremendous political denunciations
on the international plane, and this disadvantage is severe in
itself. However, when the problem of being an international
pariah is compounded by the realization that the end result of
a U.S. territorial claim would probably give the United States
a claim to an area which at present it has little foreseeable
use for (and perhaps never saw as worth claiming in the first
place) , it becomes apparent that the negative features of
making a U.S. territorial claim in Antarctica far outweigh any
positive aspects.
B. United Nations Administration of Antarctica
The second possible U.S. option for the protection of its
interests in Antarctica is to let the administration of
Antarctica be conducted under the auspices of the United
Nations. This proposal will be split into two aspects because
a corollary to the "U.N. management" concept is the reservation




The "World Park" concept is an intriguing one. The
concept basically posits that any mineral resource exploitation
in Antarctica is unacceptable, and that the overriding concern
is for the protection of the continent's fragile ecosystems
from the damage and pollution resulting from commercial
development. 279 The "World Park" idea is not a new one: it
was first proposed by the United Kingdom at the First
Consultative Meeting in Canberra, Australia, in 1961 with the
idea being to declare Antartica a "nature reserve." 280 From
the time of its first proposal to the present, the "World Park"
theory has not been acceptable to the Consultative Parties, 281
but it is currently being strongly advocated by organizations
such as Greenpeace International as a means to uphold the basic
principles of the Antarctic Treaty system and to simultaneously
ensure protection of the world environment. 282 Under this
approach, a "World Park" has become especially necessary
because of recent (1986) scientific discoveries indicating a
rapid and substantial depletion of much of the ozone layer in
the Earth's atmosphere over Antarctica. 283 This phenomenon, if
unchecked, allegedly could produce drastic changes to life on
279Myhre, supra note 210, at 100.
280Id. at 110 n. 5.
281Id. at 100.
282
"ECO", Vol xxxix, nos. 1-3, 29 Oct. 86-11 Nov. 86,
published in Tokyo, Japan by "Friends of the Earth International."
283Kindt, supra note 34, at 27.
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earth: accordingly, Antarctica needs to be maintained as a
"control area" for gauging worldwide environmental
developments. 284 An additional factor supporting the "World
Park" model is the hypersensitivity of the Antarctic
environment to pollution in general and the relatively large
destructive potential that even a small oil spill could have on
the continent's ecosystems. 285 Besides the environmental
benefits, Antarctica as a "World Park" is said to be a model
that not only readily dovetails with the basic purposes of the
Treaty but also promotes these values. It would certainly
ensure the continued demilitarization of the continent and
thereby stabilize the region in terms of security; it would
promote international cooperation in pure research by removing
the temptation to gear research toward economic exploitation,
and probably most importantly would soothe the present tensions
between members of the Antarctic "Club" and outsiders
concerning the potential resource exploitation on the
continent. 286
It is submitted that the "World Park" concept is nice in
theory but not applicable to Antarctica in reality. If there
were no resource potential in Antarctica, this concept would
have a much better chance of acceptance but, in the face of
increasing international demands for alternative sources of
284 Id.
285Id. at 70.
286See note 282, supra .
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food stocks, hydrocarbons, and hard minerals, and in light of
the substantial historical, fiscal, and scientific investments
which already exist in Antarctica under the Treaty, it is
impractical to expect either the Treaty regime or non-Treaty
nations to forego at least the ability to see for themselves
that the potential of Antarctica is either nonexistent or not
worth continued investment. At such a point in time, the
"World Park" may be an acceptable alternative for Antarctica,
but it makes little sense in the protection of U.S. interests
to give up its current investment. There is another practical
reason for not abandoning the U.S. investment as well: the
interests sought to be preserved and protected by the "World
Park" have already, for the past 27 years, been safeguarded
(and adequately so) by the Antarctic Treaty regime, which has
by consensus kept a close eye on Antarctica and on each of its
members to protect the continental environment. 287 Under the
present conditions, there is virtually no motivation for the
United States to alter its present position and espouse the
"World Park" concept. To do so would be to surrender its
substantial decision-making power within the Treaty regime
without any practical increase in benefits.
287While some nongovernmental organizations may disagree
with the position that the consultative parties are effective
guardians of Antarctica, the general consensus is that the
Treaty regime has been remarkably effective in conservation.
See generally Hambro, supra note 105; Auburn, supra note 1.





A similar surrender of control and increased risk of
investment would arise in the United Nations' administration of
Antarctica, but before the impact of that possibility is
assessed, it is necessary to examine the purported benefits of
such a system.
U.N. management of Antarctica would be premised upon
international acceptance of the theory that Antarctica and its
surrounding area are the "common heritage of mankind" and thus
are not subject to the appropriation of any nation or
combination of nations. 288 Strongly advocated by the NEO
(which again, for the most part, consists of developing third-
world nations), international (U.N.) management and control of
Antarctica would produce the benefits of true global sharing,
equitable redistribution of wealth and resources, and reduction
of world conflict by removing what this writer terms the "us v.
them" conflict inherent in Treaty/non-Treaty party differences.
Global sharing, 289 referred to as an inchoate political
interest held by developing countries outside the Treaty
system, emphasizes the values of participation in, or control
of, economic negotiations by the developing countries. 290 It
would arguably ensure that Antarctic resources would be
primarily used in alleviating the severe starvation and
malnutrition problems that currently exist in developing
288See notes 165-68, supra and accompanying text.




countries. 291 An added benefit of this approach is claimed to
be that truly international management of Antarctica could be
acceptable by applying the legal principle rebus sic
stantibus292 which essentially recognizes that, since
international conditions have undergone an extensive
transformation since 1959, a new regime is now needed to deal
with these changes and reserve Antarctica and its resources as
res communis , for the benefit of all mankind. 293 There have
been a number of suggestions concerning the formation of this
"global regime" in Antarctica: some observers would administer
Antarctica as an international trusteeship under Article 81 of
the Charter of the United Nations. 294 Others recommend an
UNCLOS Ill-type arrangement with the Antarctic equivalent of
the International Seabed Authority controlling mineral resource
development. 295 Still another plan would have Antarctica
administered by the General Assembly of the U.N. through a
291Joyner, supra note 51, at 723.
292 Id.
293 Id. No state has asserted officially that Antarctica
is terra communis . But see L. Bloomfield, Outer Space 123
(9168) . The concept originated in Roman law as a counterpart
to the terra nullius concept. The terra communis principle
suggests that common ownership precludes use of appropriation
of the area without the consent of the community. This concept
has never been recognized in international law; its only
analytical force is its logical, symmetrical relationship to
terra nullius . Burton, supra note 5, at 463.
294U.N. Charter, supra note 156.




committee composed of all Treaty parties and fifteen other
"geographically representative" states, up to a maximum of
forty states. 296 There are others, but this "global regime"
concept of universal participation is common to them all.
Even assuming the best of intentions in the United
Nations, surrender of control of Antarctica from the Antarctic
Treaty regime to the U.N. would not benefit U.S. interests.
There are few, if any, practical reasons why any Treaty party,
and particularly the United States, would support a global
regime which necessarily treats all historic claims to an
interest in Antarctica as null and void. 297 There is no valid
reason for the United States to sacrifice its historical equity
in Antarctica without any return. Applying the "common
heritage of mankind" principle itself to Antarctica has a very
tenuous legal basis, 298 and it is envisioned that any effort to
296Pinto, The International Community in Antarctica . 33
Miami L. Rev. 475 (1978) at 483-86.
297Kindt, supra note 34, at 65.
298The "common heritage of mankind" principle is
inappropriate in the Antarctic context. It is much easier to
state the principle than to state the rationale behind its
applicability to Antarctica. Application of the principle to
Antarctica has been defended on the ground that there is a
moral obligation on the part of the developed countries to
preserve resources not yet under the jurisdiction of any
country so that developing nations can also share in the
exploitation of those resources. This argument, however,
raises a question of fairness: Is it fair to require an
investor who takes the full risk of exploiting a resource to
share the benefits of that risky and costly investment? The
"common heritage of mankind" principle has its roots in the
political objective of developing nations to establish a new
international economic order. The only common bond these
nations share is their status as developing nations. Other
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force U.N. management on the consultative parties would result
in their mounting a concerted diplomatic, economic, and
political offensive against such a plan. 299 If the
international plan were to allow a developing country veto
power over any U.S. activities in Antarctica, it would surely
be objectionable. The same analysis would apply to any voting
structure that allows developing countries the power to control
access to Antarctic resources or to dictate resource
distribution. 300 The United States within the Treaty regime is
in a position (by means of the unanimity requirement of Article
IX of the Treaty) to control what transpires in Antarctica. To
surrender this position without any guaranteed benefits in
return is untenable, and is not considered to be a viable U.S.
option for the protection of its interests in Antarctica.
C. Continuation of the Antarctic Treaty Regime
Continuation of the Antarctic Treaty regime, with some
modifications, is seen by this writer as the best option the
United States has to protect its extensive interests in
Antarctica now and in the future. Neither of the two (three,
if one includes the "World Park" concept) previously discussed
developing nations which are parties to the Antarctic Treaty,
such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and India, clearly oppose any
attempt to make Antarctica the "common heritage of mankind"
because of their own vested interests in Antarctic. Parriott,
supra note 7, at 120.
299Joyner, supra note 51, at 724.
300Burton, supra note 5, at 509.
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options can afford similar protection at an acceptable cost.
The emphasis on protection of U.S. interests may be criticized
as being a parochial approach to this international problem,
but it is believed that U.S. support for the continuation of
the Antarctic Treaty regime will result not only in the
protection of U.S. interests but also in the safeguarding of
international concerns. The basic issue at the heart of the
Antarctic problem is to fashion a regime acceptable to Treaty
nations without privileging them to a degree unacceptable to
non-Treaty states. This can be accomplished, as stated above,
under the present Treaty regime (with some modifications) in
two basic ways. Despite some criticism that the Treaty regime
and its system of subordinate international agreements301 are
on their last legs302 as an effective management plan for
Antarctica, it is submitted that the development of the
Antarctic Treaty system and its present survival as a
management scheme is strong and credible evidence itself of the
vitality of the system. The Treaty regime, by adoption over
time of the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic
Flora and Fauna, the Convention of the Conservation of
Antarctic Seals, the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, and the presentation of the
newly-completed Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resources has clearly demonstrated that it is a system
301See note 159, supra.
302Auburn, supra note 1, at 290-97.
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with sufficient flexibility to allow for adjustment to changing
circumstances. This flexibility has always been acceptable to
U.S. interests. 303 Concededly, the requirement for unanimity
may restrict the capacity to reach controversial decisions, 304
but this perceived roadblock has not yet been reached and
merely because some restriction may exist it is not necessary
to concede that an acceptable solution cannot be reached
notwithstanding. The history of the Antarctic Treaty system
has shown its ability to adjust despite the unanimity
requirement. While the issue of mineral resource exploitation
does pose a significant threat to stability, the mere existence
of serious threat seems to be insufficient justification to
move away from a proven problem-solving mechanism. Indeed,
critics of the "Antarctic Club" concede both a moral and legal
responsibility exists for the Treaty regime to ensure an
establishment of a minerals regime in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty, 305 and despite
NEO/Group of 77 pressure for the application of the "common
heritage of mankind" principle to Antarctica, even these
critics admitted the achievements of the Treaty and were not
adverse to the modification of the Treaty regime as opposed to
303The U.S. Congress has approved the separate conventions
on flora and fauna, seals, and living resources with little
opposition. Parriott, supra note 7, at 105 n. 233.
304 Id. at 296.
305Simma, supra note 158, at 209.
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creation of an alternative or parallel system. 306 The "good
faith" administration by the Antarctic Treaty regime has been
recognized, 307 and its present success cannot be denied.
Vested interests exist in the maintenance of the Treaty regime
on the part of the U.S., as well as on behalf of all other
consultative parties, but political reality dictates that these
interests will not, and in my opinion cannot, be exercised
exclusively for the benefit of Treaty members. Such action
would cause nearly as much international discord as the
assertion of individual territorial claims. The need to
accommodate non-Treaty nation concerns is valid, and is
recognized by the United States as necessary to prevent a
disruption of the Antarctic Treaty system. 308 The Antarctic
Treaty system has been described as
"a pragmatic formulation deprived of ideological
connotations of any sort which enables it to sustain
a continued process of compromise and adaptation to
the changing realities relevant to the Antarctic." 309
30639 U.N. GAOR First Comm. (50th-55th mtg.), U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/39/PV. 50-55 (1984).
307Hayashi, supra note 168, at 278; Francioni, supra note
54, at 188.
308Colson, supra note 172, at 297.
309G. Triggs, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME (1987). The
advantages .of the Antarctic Treaty System have been summarized
as follows:
(a) It is open to accession by any Member State of
the United Nations, or any country which may be
invited to accede with the consent of the
Consultative Parties — it is thus as universal as
the interest of States in Antarctica;
(b) It is of unlimited duration and establishes
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Assuming the validity of that description, it remains to be
explored the manner in which the Antarctic Treaty regime may be
modified to ensure both its continued validity and the
continued protection of U.S. interests. This necessitates
accommodating the interests of both Treaty and non-Treaty
nations. There appear to be two basic models that could be
conducted under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty which
would allow for adequate accommodation. One must first look at
the two different models, and then consider some modification
(again, in accordance with the Treaty) that would be required
Antarctica as a region of unparalleled international
co-operation in the interests of all mankind;
(c) It is based on the Charter of the United
Nations, promotes its purposes and principles and
confirms Antarctica as a zone of peace; it is, in
fact, the only effective, functioning nuclear-
weapons-free zone in the world today;
(d) It excludes Antarctica from the arms race by
prohibiting any measures of a military nature, such
as the establishment of military bases and
installations, the carrying out of military
manoeuvres or the testing of any types of weapons,
including nuclear weapons, and forbids the dumping of
nuclear waste;
(e) It encourages and facilitates scientific co-
operation and the exchange of scientific information,
which is made available for the benefit of all
states
;
(f) It protects the natural environment of
Antarctica, including the Antarctic ecosystem;
(g) It provides for a comprehensive system of on-
site inspection by observers to promote the
objectives and to ensure compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty;
(h) It has averted international strife and conflict
over Antarctica, inter alia , by putting aside the
question of claims to sovereignty in Antarctica,
thereby removing the potential for dispute.
Australia, "View of States", U.N. Doc, A/39/583 (Part II) 29
October 1984, at 85.
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under either model to help make the balance of "us v. them"
more acceptable to both sides.
The first model has already been discussed. This model
looks to the flexibility of the Antarctic Treaty system as
having been proven through history to be able to adjust to
changing world conditions. 310 Since the Treaty can be modified
or amended at any time, 311 it is a vehicle already in place to
accommodate competing interests, both now and in the future.
While the Treaty does not specifically speak to mineral
resource exploration and exploitation, the new Convention on
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources illustrates the
ability of the system to attempt to deal with emerging issues.
This is not to suggest that this 1988 Convention is an
acceptable solution to all parties, nor even that it will ever
come into effect. It is beyond the scope of this paper, and
premature, to assess the effectiveness of the Convention
concerning its ability to solve the mineral resources problem.
The Convention can, however, stand as evidence of the
responsiveness of the system and of the Antarctic Treaty
regime's concern to maintain its validity not only for regime
members but also for non-parties. It is probably fair to say
that the Treaty system, in one form or another, will survive
because of geopolitical reality: it is extremely unlikely that
any Treaty nation, particularly the United States or the Soviet
310See notes 13 6-155, supra and accompanying text.
3
^Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, art. IX.
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Union, will be amenable to any major change in the status quo
of Antarctica. For all practical purposes, there is a strong
convergence of interests between American and Soviet policy in
Antarctica312 and when both of these superpowers are on the
same side of an issue, there does not seem to be much leverage
available to less powerful nations to be able to do much about
it, whether under the auspices of the United Nations or not.
Perhaps more importantly, it is not just the United States and
the Soviet Union that have vested interests in preserving the
Antarctic Treaty system. The other contracting parties must be
supportive of the continuation of the Antarctic regime because
of their respective power within the "Club" (for consultative
parties in particular) to control decision-making. The
principle of "Antarctic community" 313 will be preferred by the
present regime because the alternatives (territorial claims or
U.N. control) are less than attractive. 314 If the Treaty
nations cannot resolve Antarctic problems themselves and the
Treaty system were to collapse, the door would in theory be
open for the United Nations to step in, invited or not, to take
measures necessary to preserve international peace and
security. 315 Another factor pointing to a continuation of the
312Boczek, supra note 82, at 858.
313Burton, supra note 5, at 473, at 497.
314See Sections V.A and B, supra and accompanying text;
see also Harry, An Australian View . 21 Va. J. Int'l. L. 727 (1981)
315U.N. Charter, supra note 156, chs. VI, VII.
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Antarctic Treaty regime is the severe disadvantages that a
Treaty nation would face if it were to withdraw from the Treaty
yet try to maintain its interest/ investment in Antarctica: it
is suggested that the political implications of such action
would be extremely negative and would not be feasible in the
majority of cases. 316
Many strong arguments have been advanced for the
establishment of some form of "condominium" arrangement in
Antarctica. This second model could be accomplished under the
Antarctic Treaty, and has the additional advantage of being
acceptable under the "common heritage of mankind" concept. 317
As such, it would generally be possible to protect the
interests of the Treaty parties while also making room for the
interests of non-parties (specifically, NEO/Group of 77)
.
Although some have criticized the condominium approach as being
violative of Article IV of the Treaty in that it could be
viewed as an enlargement of an existing claim318 or,
alternatively, that it is merely something akin to collective
316Auburn, supra note 1, at 266-67.
317Francioni, supra note 54, at 172, at 188. Francioni
goes so far as to say that the present Antarctic regime
represents the only existing example of substantive
implementation of the common heritage principle. He considers
Part XI of UNCLOS III (regarding deep seabed mining) a "victim
of the overly ambitious and burdensome bureaucratic apparatus
that is to implement the . . . principle." Id. at 173.
318Marcoux, The Antarctic Continental Margin . 11 Va. J.
Int'l. L. 374 (1971).
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colonialism, 319 the better argument is that such an arrangement
is valid under the Treaty and under international law. States
can agree to limitations on their claims to either territorial
sovereignty or "open use" in Antarctica without compromising
their juridical position. 320 Thus, a claimant state can enter
into an agreement requiring that its claim be exercised or
limited in an agreed manner, and a nonclaimant state can
similarly agree concerning its exercise of its freedom of
action: such an agreement compromises neither the underlying
dispute nor the final agreement. 321 This combination of rights
and interests to create joint Antarctic sovereignty could once
again "freeze" claimancy disputes within the Antarctic Club and
in holding the continent out as a single "Antarctic coastal
state" there would arguably be jurisdiction for the condominium
over the Antarctic continental shelf for resource
exploitation. 322 To gain the basic criterion for perfected
sovereign title, i.e., general international recognition,
economic concessions could be made to the rest of the
319Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic
Resource Problem . 33 U.Miami L. Rev. 371 (1978) , at 416.
320Burton, supra note 5, at 467.
321Id.
322Alexander, supra note 319, at 414; The condominium
could declare and enforce a territorial sea, a contiguous zone,
an economic zone, and continental shelf areas. Theoretically,
the condominium would administer Antarctica as if it were one
country's territory, and accordingly, the living and nonliving
resources could be exploited as belonging to the condominium.
Kindt, supra note 34, at 63.
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international community. 323 An excellent summary of the
advantages of a condominium scenario in Antarctica is provided
by Professor Joyner:
"[A condominium] approach may be attractive to
members of the Consultative Group. It would serve
their stated desire for orderly management and
control over the commercial exploration and
exploitation of Antarctica, particularly in light of
the anticipated increase in economic interest in the
continent by non-treaty States.
Should this regime of shared rights and
responsibilities evolve, it would contain distinct
advantages for the Consultative Parties. Such a
regime could resolve the question of overlapping
claims, since sector claims would be dissolved and
the region would be managed cooperatively as a
complete entity. The resolution of the claims
question, moreover, could further the establishment
of a legal regime that would encourage commercial
interest in the region. Presumably, private ventures
would be less reluctant to invest in resource
exploitation in Antarctica if there were some
assurance that their efforts would enjoy legal
protection. The establishment of a legal authority
over the continent would also defuse the objection of
certain States to the creation of EEZs in Antarctica.
The acceptance of this coastal authority would
facilitate the assertion of EEZ and continental shelf
rights that could extend from the edge of the pack
ice in Antarctica.
Finally, an arrangement of this type could
sufficiently delineate and institutionalize the legal
status of Antarctica, thus possibly dissuading the
Group of 77 from attempting to impose an
international regulatory mechanism through the United
Nations. Hence, the Consultative Parties' interests
in the most valuable of the region's resources
—
krill, petroleum, and natural gas—would be preserved
and consolidated." (footnotes deleted). 324
323 Id,
324Joyner, supra note 51, at 721-22
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The condominium approach has been presented in various
forms but the basic features of the arrangement are as
delineated by Professor Joyner, supra . Of two of the more
interesting variations, one calls for a condominium arrangement
to oversee the Antarctic resource activities (the concept of
"Joint Antarctic Resource Jurisdiction") under the control
either of the Treaty members325 or of the United Nations, 326
the other suggests a collective authority might be possible
under Article 305(1) (f) of UNCLOS III. 327 It is outside the
purpose of this paper to assess the relative merits of each
condominium model, and efforts have been made to summarize the
salient aspects of the basic concept so that an assessment of
the condominium theory as an option to protect U.S. interests
can be made. It is submitted that U.S. support for some form
of condominium approach would protect U.S. interests in
Antarctica, especially in the area of resource exploitation.
The advantages to the United States are very similar to those
obtainable if the U.S. were to advocate a continuation of the
Antarctic Treaty regime, and in fact it may well be argued that
establishment of a condominium arrangement by, and limited to,
the Treaty members is no more than an exercise of the
flexibility by which the Treaty regime keeps pace with world
325Alexander, supra note 319, at 417.
326Pinto, supra note 189, at 483-85.




developments. A cautionary note must be added, however, to
emphasize that any condominium arrangement that the U.S.
supports must be able to ensure that U.S. policy goals (as
earlier enumerated) 328 are satisfied. It may seem pedantic to
emphasize this point, but the mere existence of a condominium
arrangement does not ipso facto make it beneficial to the
United States. Great care must be taken not to sacrifice that
which the United States already has under the existing
Antarctic Treaty regime. The drafting of a "proper"
condominium agreement will be left to others, but for this
writer's purpose such a "proper" arrangement would clearly be
in the best interests of the United States to pursue, if
circumstances dictate that such an arrangement is necessary for
Antarctica. Although the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resources is not yet effective and is not, as
presently drafted, an adequate mechanism to safeguard U.S.
interests in Antarctica, 329 it is at least arguably a good
328See note 232 supra . and accompanying text.
329Briefly, this writer sees several deficiencies in the
1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resources
:
1. U.S. access to mineral resources is not
guaranteed. In fact, voting procedures under
this Convention may give the U.S. less control
over Antarctic activities than it presently has
See Convention Articles 3, 22, 32, 48, 51, 54.
2. There are no guarantees for continuation of U.S
mining ventures, once begun. See Articles 32,
51.
3. Rules for liability are not fully established,
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faith attempt by the Treaty regime to prepare for the future
and protect its collective rights/ interests.
While either continuation of the Antarctic Treaty regime
or support for an appropriate condominium arrangement would act
to ensure U.S. interests in Antarctica, further steps must be
taken under either approach to safeguard these interests. As
stated earlier, the best option available for the United States
is the continuation of the Antarctic Treaty system including,
if necessary, an appropriate condominium arrangement within the
system. The future viability of the Treaty system, however,
and thus the effectiveness of its protection of U.S. interests,
will be dependent upon the system's ability to remain
but are left to formation by consensus in a
subsequent Protocol. Article 8(7).
4. No exploration or development is allowed until
the Article 8(7) Protocol is in force for that
party seeking to explore or develop. Article
8(9).
5. The Commission (Article 21) can prohibit mineral
resource activities if it deems such action
necessary. Article 13.
6. "Cooperation" with nongovernmental organizations
and international organizations "having a
scientific, technical, or environmental interest
in Antarctica" is mandated, but undefined.
Article 34.
7. Budgetary contributions are left to a "to-be-
determined", "equitable sharing" plan. Article
35.
8. No surplus revenue (if any) from Antarctic
development is allocated for "developing
country" use unless such country is using the
funds for Antarctic research. Article 35(7) (a).
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consistent with the principles of the Treaty and to fashion an
arrangement acceptable to the international community at
large. 330 With the increasing world competition for food,
water, and mineral resources, the extent to which the Antarctic
Treaty regime is seen as legitimate may depend in large part on
its willingness to acknowledge, and assist in alleviating,
international concerns. Additionally, any future action which
the U.S. chooses to advocate must also consider the needs of
those seven consultative parties which are claimant states
(specifically Argentina, Australia, and Chile) who for
historical and/or domestic political reasons would consider as




The first modification to the Treaty system which the
United States should espouse is to widen access to consultative
meetings by outsiders. While not suggesting that an open
public forum is necessary, the current practice of secrecy of
consultative meetings lends to non-party distrust of the Treaty
regime as a true conservator of the continent. While secrecy
may have been needed for the initial success of the Treaty in
1959, 332 it is submitted that any requirement for secrecy has
passed or, at the very least, is now outweighed by the need to
330Francioni, supra note 54, at 187.
331Alexander, supra note 319, at 417; Myhre, supra note
210, at 12-14.
332Auburn, supra note 1, at 93.
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acknowledge and accommodate outside interests. 333 Proposals
have been made to open consultative meetings to non-
consultative parties, and to extend the offer of "observer"
status to the United Nations and to other international
organizations. 334 The United States has already acknowledged
these proposals and has not indicated serious opposition to
them. 335 It would be in the best interests of the United
States to expressly endorse these ideas a means to close the
gap between Treaty and non-Treaty concerns. Another "sunshine"
provision to endorse would be the possibility of establishing a
small-scale secretariat for the Treaty regime to serve as
liaison with the United Nations and other international bodies,
to make the reports of consultative meetings public through the
United Nations, and to provide greater publicity of Antarctic
operations by means of an Antarctic periodical or the greater
circulation of research results, especially those which would
be of potential benefit to developing countries. 336 Such
efforts by the Treaty regime may go a long way toward
dispelling what has been perceived as a serious credibility
problem of the regime. 337 It is the opinion of this writer
333Myhre, supra note 210, at 5.
334Hayashi, supra note 168, at 290.
335Colson, supra note 172, at 300.
336Hayashi, supra note 168, at 290.
337Antarctica Briefing, "The French Airstrip: A Breach of
Antarctic Treaty Rules?", No. 9, July 30, 1986; see generally
Joyner , Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking
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that all proposals that entail the publicizing of regime
information be given serious favorable thought by U.S. policy
makers as a means to help legitimize the basis for the future
of the Antarctic Treaty regime.
Another modification to the Treaty regime that should be
favorably endorsed by the United States, assuming the
implementation of a mineral resources management/exploitation
plan under the Treaty system, is creating a means by which non-
Treaty members can be assured of a share in any economic
distribution of Antarctic wealth. It has become apparent that
the economic potential of Antarctica is a crucial issue to the
future viability of the Antarctic regime, and while some Treaty
members may take a very chauvinistic view which opposes sharing
Antarctic wealth with nations having no actual investment (of
time or resources) in the continent, some recognition of
international sharing of benefits may be the best method to
keep the NEO/Group of 77 nations at bay. An equitable sharing
mechanism, if properly constructed, would serve to blunt the
"colonialist" criticisms of the regime. Equitable sharing (the
precise formula for which may well result from future
negotiations between the Treaty regime and the United Nations)
would also be in conformity with the historic principles behind
the Treaty itself. 338 Perhaps most importantly, some form of
sharing would be a small price for the Treaty regime to pay to
the Problems and Prospects . 19 Cornell Int'l. L. J. 259 (1986)
.
338Antarctic Treaty, supra note 53, Preamble.
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ensure its continuing control over Antarctic operations in
general. It is conceded that any sharing arrangement would
undoubtably require very delicate and complex negotiations and
would certainly be no easy task, either for Treaty or non-
Treaty nations, but simply because a task is difficult does not
mean that it is impossible. The inherent beauty of the
Antarctic Treaty regime has historically been its flexibility
and its ability to adapt to changing world circumstances: an
acceptable sharing arrangement should be seen as simply another
challenge, dictated by the environment of today and the not-so-
distant future, that needs to be met for the Antarctic Treaty
regime to continue. As far as the United States is concerned,
any equitable sharing must first be constructed so as to
protect the U.S. interests previously listed; 339 and it must
not be established in any way that would not guarantee fair
access for the United States to the potential resources. This,
of course, would be done within a sharing arrangement which
limited itself solely to the sharing of surplus income and did
not place restrictions on the exploitation/development
operations themselves. A general framework for sharing with
non-Treaty members could include letting the United Nations, or
a branch thereof, make actual distribution of the funds, 340
leaving funds distribution to some form of sub-Treaty regime
339See notes 232, supra and .accompanying text,
340Burton, supra note 5, at 497.
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commission, 341 or channeling the funds to an organization such
as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund for use in a
global development effort. 342 A potential problem here is
that, since the resource potential of Antarctica is still
speculative, 343 any discussion of the distribution of proceeds
is also no more than conjecture. It seems clear, however, that
the sharing would have to be limited to any surplus income that
remains from resource exploitation after allowance is made for
the substantial investment costs, a reasonable profit margin
commensurate with the high risks involved for the investors
(private or state) , and the administrative costs of the
system. 344 Again, resolution of this problem will be a test of
the validity of the Treaty regime, but it is not an
insurmountable test: since these economic benefits will accrue
to the international community at large without requiring on
its part either active participation or investment in
Antarctica, the argument for international acceptance is
strong. 345 This sharing arrangement would serve to negate much
of the potential conflict between the Antarctic Treaty regime
and the rest of the international community.
341Luard, supra note 31, at 1188.
342Burton, supra note 5, at 510.
343See notes 193-204, supra and accompanying text.
344Auburn, supra note 1, at 265.
345Alexander, supra note 319, at 422.
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While support for continuation of the Antarctic Treaty
regime (with or without a condominium arrangement) is in the
best interests of the United States, there is one more area in
which the United States should take action to protect its
Antarctic investment. As stated previously, the Treaty regime
has the flexibility to adjust to changing conditions, but
merely possessing this flexibility is no guarantee that the
regime will always be able to adapt. Similarly, there is no
guarantee that one or more consultative parties other than the
United States will not move to terminate the Treaty, or
withdraw from it, if their particular interests so require.
Such action in theory could begin as early as 1993, 346
notwithstanding any U.S. efforts to the contrary, and likewise
could occur at virtually any time after 1993 upon the request
of any consultative party to "review the operation of the
Treaty." 347 In light of this possibility, it is necessary for
the United States to take measures at the present time to
protect its Antarctic interests if such a "worst case scenario"
were to emerge. It is submitted that it is in the best
interests of the United States to maintain at least its present
level of interest and investment in Antarctica and, if
possible, to strengthen the U.S. stake by enlarging the present
scientific bases and camps as well as by establishing new ones,
especially in any areas where a pre-1961 U.S. presence was




effected by either government programs or private expeditions
by U.S. nationals. As the Soviet Antarctic program has
shown, 348 the Soviets have not failed to take advantage of the
opportunities provided by their presence on the continent to
strengthen the Soviet case for any future territorial
claims. 349 Its steadily expanding scientific and exploratory
program has prepared a solid base to bolster the Soviet
bargaining position in any future allocation of Antarctic
rights. 350 The United States would be well advised to consider
a similar program, not only to counter Soviet positioning but
also to ensure its own future interests if it ever becomes
necessary to assert a U.S. territorial claim in Antarctica.
While some argue that the termination of the Antarctic Treaty
will result in the legal status of the consultative parties
reverting to the status quo ante of 1959, 351 it is probably
more in line with political reality to recognize that no nation
is likely to sacrifice all that it has invested in Antarctica
since 1959 even if the Treaty ends. 352 Political reality
aside, there is nothing in international law that would prevent
the United States (or any other nation) from either asserting a
348See notes 92-102, supra and accompanying text.
349Boczek, supra note 82, at 857.
350Id. at 857-58.
351Boczek, supra note 82, at 857.




new claim or enlarging an existing claim, 353 and the United
States must be in a position to do just that were the Treaty to
no longer be in effect. Even though Article IV (2) of the
Treaty "freezes" claims in Antarctica, it can still be argued
that such a freeze would not apply to continuing Antarctic
activities354 whether instituted before or after the effective
date of the Treaty. Thus, accepting either the "political
reality" position or the "continuing activity" approach, a
post-Treaty framework would be in place for the assertion of
territorial claims, and it behooves the United States to be in
a position from which a strong claim can be made. The United
States clearly has the historical and equitable basis for a
territorial claim: 355 it remains up to the United States to
ensure that this basis is recognized, if necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis, a reassessment has been made
and it is submitted that neither the assertion of a U.S.
territorial claim nor the relinquishment of present U.S.
authority (under the Antarctic Treaty) to the United Nations
would be in the best interest of the United States. Assertion
of a territorial claim by the United States would be lacking a
firm foundation under international law, would promote
353 Id. at 92 n. 179.
354 Id. at 92-3.
355See notes 67-79, supra and accompanying text.
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extremely negative international reaction, and would surely
result in international conflict as other nations rushed in to
claim territorial sections of the continent. It is impossible
to recreate the American "Wild West" in the Antarctica of
today. Furthermore, if international law is to be given any
recognition, a U.S. territorial claim might relegate the United
States to being forced to accept a claim in Antarctica that, at
present, is relatively useless. Nor would United Nations
management of Antarctica put the United States in any better
position: The United States would be in the clear minority in
any U.N. decision-making, given the voting majority of the
Group of 77 and the clamor for Antarctic "rights" by the NEO.
All U.N. management plans proposed would result in the United
States' giving up the power it now has under the Treaty in
return for virtually nothing, unless one considers the value of
unrequited "global sharing" a reasonable return on a multi-
million dollar investment.
This reassessment concludes that the only viable option
which maximizes the protection of U.S. policy concerns in
Antarctica is a continuation of the Antarctic Treaty regime,
with modifications as necessary. Its proven flexibility and
adaptability have clearly shown that the system can adjust to
changing needs: the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of
Antarctic Mineral Resources is but the most recent example of
the system's attempt to be responsive. The Treaty regime, to
be sure, must now take action to accommodate non-Treaty nation
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concerns and to deal with the imminent exploitation of
resources. The solution cannot be found totally in the 1988
Convention. The modifications proposed in this paper may go a
long way toward meeting those challenges: only the future can
tell that. In the meantime, however, and in preparation for a
"worst case" scenario, the United States should continue to
strengthen its historical and equitable bases for any future
territorial claim, should circumstances beyond the control of
the United States dictate a course of action which results in
the termination of the Antarctic Treaty. It would not be in
the interests of the United States to initiate such a course,






The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French
Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall
continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall
not become the scene or object of international discord;
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge
resulting from international co-operation in scientific investigation in
Antarctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the contin-
uation and development of such co-operation on the basis of freedom of
scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International
Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress
of all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peace-
ful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in
Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of
military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel
or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.
Article II
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and co-operation to-
ward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year,
shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.
Article III
1. In order to promote international co-operation in scientific inves-
tigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article 11 of the present Treaty,
the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and
practicable:
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Anuirc-
tica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and effi-
ciency of operations;
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between
expeditions and stations;
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be ex-
changed and made freely available.
2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to
the establishment of co-operative working relations with those Special-
ized Agencies of the United Nations and other international organiza-
tions having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica

Article IV
1. Noihing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignly in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may
have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in
Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its
recognition or non-recognition of any other Stale's right of or
claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, 10 terri-
torial sovereignty in Antarcuca shall be asserted while the present Treaty
is in force.
Article V
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal ihere of
radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.
2. In the cveni of the conclusion of international agreements concern-
ing the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the
disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the Contracting
Parties whose representatives arc entitled lo participate in the meetings
provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established under
such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.
Article VI
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of
60° South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present
Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of
the rights, of any Slate under international law wilh regard to the high




In order lo promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the
provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Parly whose represen-
tatives are entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX
of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers lo carry oui any
inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nation-
als of the Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of ob-
servers shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having
the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the
termination of their appointment.
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of para-
graph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time
to any or all areas of Antarctica.
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and
equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of
discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be
open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance
with paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any lime over any or all
areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right lo
designate observers.
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty
enters into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and there-
after shall give them notice in advance, of
(a) all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the pari of its ships
or nationals, and all expeditions lo Antarctica organized in or
proceeding from its territory;
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced
by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in para-




1. In order 10 facilitate the exercise of their functions under the
present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the
Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons iti Ant-
arctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article Vll and sci-
entific personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph 1 (b) of Article 111 of
the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such persons,
shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parly of which
they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they
are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article,
and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of sub-paragraph 1
(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute
with regard to the exercise ofjurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately
consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
Article IX
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble
to the present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two
months after the dale of entry into force of ihc Treaty, and thereafter at
suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information,
consulting together on matters ofcommon interest pertaining to Antarc-
tica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their Gov-
ernments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the
Treaty, including measures regarding:
—
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of unci national scientific co-operation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided
for in Article VII of the Treaty;
(<•) questions relating lo the exercise ofjurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present
Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint repre-
sentatives to participate in the meetings referred lo in paragraph 1 ofthe
present Article, during such time as that Contracting Parly demonstrates
its iniercst in Antarctic.! by conducting substantial scientific research
activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the
despatch of a scientific expedition.
3. Reports from the observers referred lo in Article Vll of the present
Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting
Parlies participating in the meetings referred lo in paragraph 1 of the
present Article.
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall In-
come effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties whose rep-
resentatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider
those measures.
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be
exercised as from the date of entry into force of the Treaty whether or
not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been pro-
posed, considered or approved as provided in this Article.

Article X.
Lach of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate ef-
forts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end thai
no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the present Treaty.
Article XI
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of lite Contracting Panics
concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those
Contracting Parlies shall consult among themselves with a view to having
the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own
choice.
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent,
in each case, of all parlies lo the dispute, be referred to the International
Court ofJustice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on refer-
ence lo the liHern.uion.il Court shall not absolve parlies lo the dispute
from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the




(«) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any lime
h\ unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parlies whose representa-
tives are entitled lo participate in the meetings provided for under Arti-
cle IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when
the depositary Government has received notice from all such Contract-
ing Parties thai they have ratified it.
(h) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force
as to any other Contracting Party when notice of ratification by it has
been received by the depositary Government. Any such Contracting
Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of
two years from the dale of eniry into force of the modification or
amendment in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 1 (a) of
this Article shall be deemed lo have withdrawn from the present Treaty
on the date of the expiration of such period.
2.
—
(a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the dale of entry
into force of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting Parlies whose
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for
under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the
depositary Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parlies shall
be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the Treaty.
(b) Any modification or amendment lo the present Treaty which is
approved at such a Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parlies
there represented, including a majority of those whose representatives
are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX,
shall be communicated by the depositary Government lo all the Con-
tracting Parlies immediately after the termination of the Conference and
shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of
the present Article.
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force
in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 1 (a) of this Article
within a period of two years after ihe date of its communication to all the
Contracting Parties, any Contracting Parly may at any time after the
expiration of that period give notice to the depositary Government of its
withdrawal from ihe present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall lake




1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
Stales. It shall be open for accession by any Slate which is a Member of
the United Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to accede
to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose repre-
sentatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under
Article IX of the Treaty.
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by
each State in accordance with its constitutional processes.
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby
designated as the depositary Government.
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or
accession, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty and of any
modification or amendment thereto.
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory
Slates, the present Treaty shall enter into force for those Stales and for
Slates which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the
Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding Slate upon the deposit of
its instruments of accession.
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Govern-
ment pursuant to Article 102 -of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XIV
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish
languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Government of the United Slates of America, which shall
transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signa-
tory and acceding States.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized,
have signed the present Treaty.




Territorial Claims in Antarctica
eprinted from M.J. DeWit, MINERALS AND MINING IN ANTARCTICA (1985)

APPENDIX C
In a letter dated December 14, 1946, acting Secretary of
State Acheson suggested to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal that
the U.S. Naval Antarctic Developments Project, 1947, drop
containers enclosing written claims from airplanes and deposit
written claims in cairns. Secretary Acheson suggested the
written claims be expressed in the following form:





of the United States Naval Antarctic Developments
Project, 1947, operating by direction of the
President of the United States of America and
pursuant to instructions of the Secretary of the
Navy, being engaged in the discovery, investigation,
and survey of land and sea areas of the Antarctic
regions and being in command of a party carrying out
the aforesaid instructions,
Hereby declare that we have discovered and
investigated the following land and sea areas:
(Here describe briefly what the party has done,
means of transportation, course taken, and inclusive
dates.
)
And I hereby claim this territory in the name of
the United States of American and in support of this
claim I have displayed the flag of the United States
thereon and have deposited this record thereof under
the following circumstances:
(Here indicate where and how deposited, or
dropped from airplane at approximately
South Latitude, and Longitude






























c.l The USA, the Antarctic
Treaty, and territorial
claims.
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